ELE, CAMBRIDGE ANCIENT HISTORY
LATE ANTIQUITY EMPIRE AND SUCCESSORS OO Pee
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
THE CAMBRIDGE ANCIENT HISTORY
VOLUME XIV
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
THE CAMBRIDGE ANCIENT HISTORY
VOLUME XIV
Late Antiquity: Empire and Successors, A.D. 425—600
Edited by AVERIL CAMERON Warden of Keble College, Oxford
BRYAN WARD-PERKINS Fellow of Trinity College, Oxford
MICHAEL WHITBY Professor of Ancient History, University of Warwick
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CONTENTS
List of maps List of text-figures Preface
PART I CHRONOLOGICAL OVERVIEW
1 The western empire, 425-76 by PETER HEATHER, Reader in Early Medieval History, University College London 1 The era of Aetius, 425-54 1 The fall of the western empire ur Conclusion
2 The eastern empire: Theodosius to Anastasius by A.D. LEE, Senior Lecturer in Classics and Ancient History at the University of Wales, Lampeter 1 Theodosius II 11 The successors of Theodosius 1 Anastasius
3 Justin I and Justinian by AVERIL CAMERON r Justin I (518-27) 11 Justinian’s early years (527-32) ur St Sophia, the ‘reconquest’ and the middle years (6. 532-54) tv Religious policy: the Three Chapters and the Fifth Oecumenical Council v_ The last decade (¢. 5 54-65)
4 The successors of Justinian by MICHAEL WHITBY
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r Justin II page 86
1 Tiberius mr Maurice Iv. Conclusion
The western kingdoms by ROGER COLLINS, Research Fellow in the Department of History, University of Edinburgh 1 Gaul: Visigothic kingdom, 418-507 mu The Burgundian kingdom, 412-534 ur Frankish Gaul, 481-596 Iv Spain: the Suevic kingdoms, 425—5 84 v_ Visigothic Spain, 456—6o1 vi Vandal Africa, 429-5 33 vit Ostrogothic Italy, 493-5 35 vu Italy: the Lombards, 568—90 1x The British Isles: Anglo-Saxon, Irish and Pictish kingdoms, 410-597
PART II GOVERNMENT AND INSTITUTIONS
Emperor and court by MICHAEL McCORMICK, Professor of History, Harvard University 1 The physical context of power 1 The emperor ur The court: the human element Iv Court and ceremony v Court and culture
Government and administration by SAM BARNISH, Lecturer in Late Roman and Early Medieval European History, Royal Holloway College, University of London, A. D. LEE aid MICHAEL WHITBY rt Sources 1 The structures of government ur Administration in operation tv Administrative change v From Rome to Byzantium
Administration and politics in the cities of the fifth to the mid seventh century: 425-640
by J. H. W. G. LIEBESCHUETZ, Professor Emeritus of the University of Nottingham
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CONTENTS vil 1 East and west: common trends page 207 1 The cities of the east 210 ur Administration and politics in the west 229 tv. Conclusion 236 9 Roman law 238 by DETLEF LIEBS, Professor of Roman and Ciwil Law, University of Freiburg im Breisgau 1 Introduction: law in the late Roman empire 238 1 ©The jurisdiction 240 ur Sources of law and law making 242 Iv. Codification 244 v_ Law schools 253 vi_ Legal literature 255 vit Continuity, vulgarization, classicism 258 10 Law in the western kingdoms between the fifth and the seventh century 260 by T. M. CHARLES-EDWARDS, Jesus Professor of Celtic, University of Oxford 1 Law and ethnic identity 262 1 Edicts and judgements 263 ut Lawbooks and codes 269 tv. The evolution of Frankish written law 271 v_ From north-west Europe to the Mediterranean 278 vt Barbarian and Roman law 282 vit Burgundian and Gothic law 284 11 The army, ¢ 420-602 288 by MICHAEL WHITBY 1 Troops: categories, conditions of service, numbers 288 11 Navies 293 ur Western collapse 295 tv. The eastern army: men and resources 300 v_ Eastern survival 308 PART III EAST AND WEST: ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 12 Land, labour and settlement 315 by BRYAN WARD-PERKINS 1 The issues and the evidence 315
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CONTENTS 11 Population; the spread of settlement; demographic decline? page 320 ur Rural settlement (villages, farmsteads and villas) 327 tv Rural fortifications 335 v The pattern of land ownership; the status of peasants 336 Specialized production and exchange 3.46 by BRYAN WARD-PERKINS 1 Difficulties and evidence 346 1 The general picture 350 ur The extent of the change 361 tv Beyond the frontiers of the empire 362 v_ Regional and local variation 363 vi ‘Prosperity’ and ‘sophistication’ 365 vil The distribution of goods and wealth within the late antique economy: the role of overseas commerce 369 vu State and aristocratic distribution; the effects of taxation on the economy 377 1x Causes of economic decline: a general consideration 381 x War, disruption and economic decline 383 xr Climate, the environment and the economy 386 x11 Population change and economic change 388 xu Economic decline: some conclusions 390 The family in the late Roman world 392 by ANDREA GIARDINA, Professor of Roman History, University of Rome La Sapienza 1 Christianity and laws on the family 392 11 Law and society 399 ur Negations of the family 407 Iv. West and east All Family and friendship in the west 416 by IAN N. WooD, Professor of Early Medieval History, University of Leeds State, lordship and community in the west (¢ A.D. 400-600) 437 by PETER HEATHER 1 The community of the realm 437 1 Peers and lords: local communities 455 Armies and society in the later Roman world 469 by MICHAEL WHITBY 1 Military power and authority 470
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CONTENTS ix i The maintenance of order page 475 1 Local and central 480 tv Soldier and civilian 485 PART IV THE PROVINCES AND THE NON-ROMAN WORLD 18 The north-western provinces 497 by IAN N. WOOD 19 Italy, A.p. 425-605 525 by MARK HUMPHRIES, Lecturer in Ancient Classics at the National University of Ireland, Maynooth 1 Italian interests and the end of the western empire (425-76) 526 11 Odoacer and Theoderic (476-526) 529 ur The end of the Ostrogothic kingdom (526-68) 533 tv Forging the Lombard kingdom (568-605) 535 v_ Italy transformed: the ruling élite 538 vi. The church and the papacy 540 vu Settlement and society 544 vu Italian identities in late antiquity 548 tx Conclusion 550 20 Vandal and Byzantine Africa 552 by AVERIL CAMERON 1 The Vandal conquest and Vandal rule (a.p. 429-5 34) 553 i ©The Byzantine conquest and Byzantine rule 559 21a Asia Minor and Cyprus 570 by CHARLOTTE ROUECHE, Reader in Classical and Byzantine Greek, King’s College, University of London 1 Sources 570 wu The political geography 571 ur The historical framework 575 tv The cities 577 v_ City and countryside 583 vi The end of the civic era 585 21b Syria, Palestine and Mesopotamia 588
by HUGH KENNEDY, Professor of Middle Eastern History, University of St Andrews
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21¢ Egypt page 612 by JAMES G. KEENAN, Professor of Classical Studies, Loyola University,
Chicago
22a The Sasanid monarchy 638 by ZESEV RUBIN, Professor of History, University of Tel Aviv
t Romans and Sasanids 638
1 Royal legitimation 644
tr Sasanid kings and the Zoroastrian priests 647
Iv Kings and nobles 651
v Taxation and military organization 654
vi Sasanid collapse 659
22b Armenia in the fifth and sixth century 662
by R. W. THOMSON, Calouste Gulbenkian Professor of Armenian Studies, University of Oxford
22¢ The Arabs 678 by LAWRENCE I. CONRAD, Fdistorian of Near Eastern Medicine, Wellcome Institute 1 Introduction: the question of sources 678 1 The Arabs in late antiquity 679 ur Arabian religious traditions 682 tv. Economic life in Arabia 686 Vv _Lmperium and imperial politics 689 vi Mecca, Muhammad and the rise of Islam 695 23. The Balkans and Greece, 420-602 Jol by MICHAEL WHITBY t Introduction Jol 1 The Huns 704 mr From the Huns to the Avars 712 tv From Roman to post-Roman 721
PART V RELIGION AND CULTURE
24 The organization of the church 731 by STUART GEORGE HALL, Professor Emeritus of Ecclesiastical History, King’s College London
1 Bishops and patriarchs 731 11 Councils and clergy 736 ui Finance 741 Iv Teaching 742
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Monasticism page 745 by PHILIP ROUSSEAU, Andrew W. Mellon Professor of Early Christian Studies, Catholic University of America
Holy Men 781 by PETER BROWN, Professor of History, Princeton University
The definition and enforcement of orthodoxy 811 by PAULINE ALLEN, Director, Centre for Early Christian Studies, Australian Catholic University
1 The Councils of Ephesus I and I 811
ir The Council of Chalcedon 814 mr Aftermath of Chalcedon 815 Iv. Zeno and Basiliscus 816 v_ Anastasius I 818
vi_ Justin I and Justinian 820 vil Justinian’s successors 828 Philosophy and philosophical schools 835
by ANNE SHEPPARD, Senior Lecturer in Classics, Royal Holloway College, University of London
t Introduction 835
11 Philosophy in Athens 837 ur Philosophy in Alexandria 843 tv Philosophy elsewhere in the empire 852 Education in the Roman empire 855
by the late ROBERT BROWNING, formerly Professor Emeritus of Classics, Birkbeck, College, University of London
The visual arts 884 by ROBIN CORMACK, Professor of the History of Art, Courtauld Lnstitute of Art, University of London
1 Artistic evidence and its interpretation 886
1 =©Church and art in the fifth century 894
ur “The age of Justinian’ 902 tv. Church, monks and art at the end of the sixth
century gi2
Building and architecture 918
by MARLIA MUNDELL MANGO, University Lecturer in Byzantine Archaeology and Art, and Fellow of St John’s College, Oxford 1 Introduction 918
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1 Secular architecture page 924
ur Religious architecture 955
tv Conclusion 971 Conclusion 972 Chronological table 982 BIBLIOGRAPHY 987 Abbreviations 987 Frequently cited works 990 PartI: Chronological overview (chapters 1-5) 994 Part II: Government and institutions (chapters 6-11) 1004 Part III: East and west: economy and society (chapters 12-17) 1028 Part IV: The provinces and the non-Roman world (chapters 18—23) 1046 Part V: Religion and culture (chapters 24-31) 1080 Conclusion 1099 Index TI02
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The Roman world of the fifth and sixth century Justinian’s empire in 565
The eastern frontier
The Balkan frontier
The post-Roman west
Cities of the fifth and sixth century
Settlements of the fifth and sixth century Specialized production and exchange
The northern and western provinces
Late Roman and Ostrogothic Italy 425-5 35 Lombard and Byzantine Italy ¢. a.D. 600
The central provinces of Vandal and Byzantine Africa North Africa in Vandal and Byzantine times
Asia Minor and Cyprus
Provinces and principal cities of the east A.D. 500 Archaeological sites and regions within the eastern provinces Egypt
Sasanid Iran
Armenia and its neighbours
Pre-Islamic Arabia and its northern neighbours The Balkans and Greece
Building in late antiquity
Building in the eastern provinces
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Threats to the western empire, ¢ 425
Vandal and Alan settlements in North Africa
Suevic expansion in Spain, c 440-4
The city of Constantinople
The late antique village site of Bamuqga in the north Syrian limestone massif
The fortified farmstead of Nador in Mauretania
Ancient sites in the north Syrian uplands
The late antique large village of Kaper Pera in the north Syrian limestone massif
South elevation and plan of the baths built in 473 at the village of Sergilla, in the Syrian Jabal Zawiye
The south Italian villa of S. Giovanni di Ruoti in the late fifth century
The sixth-century monastery of a holy man, Elias, excavated at Scythopolis, in Palaestina II
Distribution of one type of pot produced by the third/fourth- century Roman potteries located in the area of Oxford
Stone houses in the late antique Syrian village of Déhés Coin-finds from the town of Luna in Liguria, Italy, and from the village of Déhés in northern Syria
Recorded finds of one type of late antique chancel-screen African red-slip ware recorded on five sites in the western Mediterranean
City territories of Gaul known to have raised troops in the sixth century
Leaf from the Notitia Dignitatum. Insignia of the comes limitis Aegypti
Relief from a limestone grave-marker showing a bearded monk
Fragment of a papyrus codex from Antinoopolis with illustration of five charioteers
Deed of surety sworn to the heirs of Flavius Apion
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The walls of Thessalonica page 710 Tsaricin Grad (Justiniana Prima) 719 Athens in the fifth century A.D. 723 The ‘Palace of the Giants’ at Athens 724 The Library of Hadrian at Athens 725 Gamzigrad (Acquis), sixth-century church within ruins of
palace of Galerius 726 Laoco6n: miniature from the Vatican Virgil 888 Mosaic panel of the Hospitality of Abraham, S. Maria
Maggiore, Rome 890 Mosaic panel of the Hospitality of Abraham and Sacrifice of
Isaac, S. Vitale, Ravenna 892 Mosaic of the Annunciation to Mary and Joseph and of the Adoration of the Magi, S. Maria Maggiore, Rome 897 Mosaics of saints in the Rotunda (church of St George), Thessalonica 899 Silver paten from the Riha Treasure, Dumbarton Oaks gol The nave of St Sophia, Constantinople 904. Sanctuary and apse with mosaic of Christ between angels and
St Vitalis and bishop Ecclesius, S. Vitale, Ravenna 907 Encaustic icon of the Virgin and Child with angels and saints, monastery of St Catherine, Sinai 913 Lead ampulla from the cathedral treasury at Monza 914 Mosaic panel from the church of St Demetrius in Thessalonica, showing the Virgin and Child enthroned 916 Plan of Rome 920 Plan of Constantinople 921 Plan of Justiniana Prima 922 Plan of Dar Qita in the Jabal Barisha, Syria 925 Plan of Augustaion and surrounding area, Constantinople 929 Column in the Forum of Leo, Constantinople 930 The Arcadiane at Ephesus 931 Street of the sixth century in Caesarea Maritima 932 Thermae and porticoed street at Scythopolis 937 Thermal baths at Gadara in Palaestina IT 939 Laura monastery at Kellia in Egypt 944 Coenobitic monastery founded in 473 near Jerusalem 946 ‘Palace of the Giants’ at Athens 949 Palaces of Antiochus and Lausus at Constantinople 951 Two-storey house at Salamis, Cyprus 952 House of 510 at Refade in Syria 954 Longitudinal sections of western and eastern basilicas, Ravenna 957 The church of St Demetrius, Thessalonica 959
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TEXT-FIGURES The church of St John the Evangelist, Ephesus page 960 The church of Sts Sergius and Bacchus, Constantinople 962 Church of St Sophia, Constantinople 964 Church at Jirade in Syria 966 Church at Behyo in Syria 967 Baptistery at the shrine of St Symeon Stylites at Qal‘at Sim‘an in Syria 968 Synagogue at Horvat Susiya in Palaestina I 970
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PREFACE
The decision to extend The Cambridge Ancient History to the end of the sixth century, from the closing date of a.p. 324 selected for the first edition of 1938, has already been explained in the Preface to Volume XIII. Scholarship in Britain lagged behind continental Europe in the discovery of ‘late antiquity’, which suffered (and to some extent still suffers) from the disadvantage of falling between the two stools of ‘ancient history’ and ‘medieval history’. However, in 1964 the political and institutional param- eters of the period were magisterially set out in English in A. H. M. Jones’s The Later Roman Empire 284-602. A Social, Economic and Administrative Survey, which was followed seven years later by the very different picture presented in Peter Brown’s World of Late Antiquity (1971).
Jones’s evidence consisted primarily of legal texts, administrative docu- ments and narrative political histories, from which he constructed a pow- erful, if undeniably bleak, image of the late Roman state; whereas Brown exploited mainly hagiography and the writings of pagan and Christian A#- rati to reconstruct a world of vibrant (if somewhat anxious) spiritual and intellectual debate. More recently, in work pioneered by French and Italian scholars, the abundant and ever-increasing archaeological evidence for the period has also been brought into play. This material evidence proved con- clusively that, in the eastern Mediterranean at least, late antiquity was no mere appendage to classical glories, but a period of spectacular prosperity and splendour.
It is our hope that CAH XIV mirrors and builds on earlier work on late antiquity; and that it provides an introduction to the richness of the different sources and different approaches that are now readily available for this period. As a multi-author work, it cannot have the crispness and sense of direction of the best single-author surveys, and we have not attempted as editors to iron out differences of opinion or of emphasis. On the other hand, there are obvious merits in multiple authorship. In particular, no single scholar can hope to be as much at home in sixth-century Britain as in Egypt, nor as comfortable with late antique saints as with barbarian war- lords; so a wide range of expertise is needed to provide detailed introduc- tions to specific fields of knowledge. Furthermore, multiplicity of opinion
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XVili PREFACE
and approach characterizes modern scholarship; and this volume may rather be faulted as too single-minded in its overall shape than as too diverse.
The dates selected for the start and finish of the volume (crea 425 and circa 600) ate, of course, primarily dates of convenience, in order to break ‘history’ into bite-size chunks and single, if door-stopper, volumes. The 4208 ate, however, a reasonable point for an historical break. In the west, the Vandal invasion of Africa in 429 brought about a decisive decline in imperial resources and influence; while, in the east, the growth of Hunnic power in the 430s was a very significant development. Historiographically, the now fragmentary History of Olympiodorus, which covered both western and eastern developments in some detail, concluded in 425, to be continued by the much more Constantinopolitan focus of Priscus’ narra- tive; while the eastern ecclesiastical historians Socrates, Sozomen and Theodoret all avoided providing a thorough account of the Nestorian con- troversy and the 431 First Council of Ephesus, leaving this to their succes- sors Liberatus and Evagrius. Our concluding date of circa 600 also needs some explanation, since it marks the end of the entire Cambridge Ancient Fiistory, and must therefore mark the approximate date when we think ‘antiquity’ ended. In the west, in politics, an earlier concluding date would probably be simpler: either towards the end of the fifth century, with the definitive fall of the western empire; or around 550, with the defeat of the Ostrogothic successor-state in Italy and the firm establishment in northern Europe of Frankish power. In the west, it is principally in terms of cultu- ral and social continuities (in particular, in the survival of a recognizably ‘Romar episcopal and secular aristocracy) that our ‘long’ late antiquity, reaching up to A.D. 600, is justified. This is, indeed, close to what Henri Pirenne expounded in Mahomet et Charlemagne in 1937, though few scholars nowadays would agree with his argument for underlying economic conti- nuity through the fifth and sixth centuries.
In the east, the choice of circa A.D. 600 as a concluding date for a history of antiquity is more straightforward (despite a recent fashion for extend- ing late antiquity up to 750 and beyond), and received authoritative sanc- tion in Jones’s decision to draw his work to a close with the death of Mautice in A.D. 602. Scholars may debate whether the eastern empire had begun a process of serious decline at an earlier date (perhaps with the Great Plague of 5 41/2, or with the Slav and Avar invasions of the Balkans at the end of the century), but no one disputes that the Persian wars and Arab conquests of the earlier seventh century brought about dramatic and, as it turned out, irreversible shifts in the balance of power and pollit- ical geography of the east, accompanied by a bouleversement of the polliti- cal, social and economic order. Out of the dramatic events of the seventh century came eventually those changes in religious, cultural and ethnic
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PREFACE xix
identity that created the Arab and Islamic Near East and North Africa, and destroyed for ever the political and cultural unity of the ancient Mediterranean.
Although strong and valid arguments can be made for continuities in many fields of life up to around A.D. 600, it is also undeniably the case that the political and military upheavals of the fifth century in the west began a process whereby separate regions of the former empire went their separ- ate ways and developed their own distinctive identities. Furthermore, in cultural and social life there was a great deal of diversity even within the politically united eastern empire. It is our hope that this volume brings out, particularly in its long regional section (Part rv), not only the ways in which the fifth- and sixth-century Roman world was still united and identifiable as ‘ancient’, but also the ways in which it was diverging from older patterns of life and fragmenting into separate units.
In contrast to earlier volumes that cover Roman history, the two volumes of the CAA that deal with late antiquity are probably more eastern than western Mediterranean in their focus. In part, this merely reflects the estab- lishment of a specifically eastern polity during the fourth century, so that political ‘events’ now take place in the east as well as in the west. But it also reflects the way that the eastern empire came to dominate the political and mental worlds of the fifth and sixth centuries. The earliest barbarian suc- cessor-states in the west were, for the most part, in theory still part of a Roman empire, and after 476 this was an eastern-based power. Further- more, the reality of eastern wealth and military muscle was brought home to the west very forcibly during the sixth century, when Justinian ‘re- conquered’ Vandal Africa, Ostrogothic Italy and part of Visigothic Spain.
The centring of this volume on the Mediterranean and its leanings towards the east are in fact fortunate, given the decision, subsequent to the initial planning of CAH, to recommission the Cambridge Medieval History and to have a first, overlapping volume, running from A.D. 500 to 700. The CMH, inevitably and reasonably (from the perspective of later history), is essentially a history of what was to become Europe, and offers only partial coverage of events and developments in the Byzantine and Arab regions of the Mediterranean. By contrast, the CAH, including this volume, is equally correct (from the perspective of antiquity) to centre itself firmly on the Mediterranean, and to treat northern Europe as somewhat peripheral.
The work of editing CAH XIV was a genuinely collaborative venture, and, as a result, both pleasant and instructive. The three editors together were responsible for the overall shape of the book, and subject matter and length of the chapters, and their allocation to individual authors (aided at an early stage by John Matthews). All three editors subsequently read and commented on both first and second drafts of each chapter.
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XxX PREFACE
Our main debt of gratitude must be to the individual authors whose work is here presented: for being prepared to summarize their complex knowledge within a meagre allocation of words; and for their courtesy in responding to our promptings and suggestions. All of us have learnt a great deal from working with their chapters. We are particularly grateful to those authors who, for one reason or another, had to step into the breach at the last minute, and yet (without exception) produced full and stimulating chapters. We also must apologize to those who were prompt in submitting their work and then had to wait while other distinguished members of the camel-train were politely goaded into action.
Once again Barbara Hird has compiled the index. The editors are pleased to take this opportunity to acknowledge her enormous contribu- tion to The Cambridge Anaent History. With the exception of Volume VII.1, and of Volume XII which is not yet in production, all of the volumes from V to XIV have been indexed by Barbara Hird. Her meticulously detailed and intelligent indexes draw together the scattered contents of these huge works and make them easily accessible to readers.
Both the editors and the individual contributors would also like to thank the many people and institutions who gave permission for their illustrative material to be reproduced.
Finally, it is a very pleasant duty to thank Pauline Hire at Cambridge University Press for all her help. She has seen the new CAF/ through from its very beginnings in 1970, and has been endlessly patient and helpful with us, despite our many academic twistings and turnings. Although this is not quite the last volume of the new CAF/ to appear, we are delighted to con- gratulate her on reaching the final date of A.D. 600, a long way from the ‘Geological Ages’ which opened Volume I. The commissioning and pro- duction of the new Cambridge Ancient History was a massive enterprise; that it succeeded is due to Pauline’s efficiency, courtesy and perseverance.
ALC.
B.W.-P. M.W.
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CHAPTER 1
THE WESTERN EMPIRE, 425-76
PETER HEATHER
On 23 October 425 the emperor Valentinian HI was installed as ruler of the western half of the Roman empire. The act was a triumph for the Theodosian dynasty, which had lost its grip on the west following the death of Valentinian’s uncle, the emperor Honorius, on 15 August 423, and, at first sight, a remarkable demonstration of imperial unity. The young Valentinian (born on 2 July 419) had been taken to Constantinople by his mother Galla Placidia even before Honorius died. Valentinian’s father, Plavius (Fl) Constantius, had done much to reconstitute the western empire in the 410s. He then married Galla Placidia (Honorius’ sister) on 1 January 417 at the start of his second consulship, and had himself declared co-emperor of the west in February 421. He died the following September, before he could extract recognition of his self-promotion from Constantinople. His death let loose an extended power struggle in the west, which at first centred on controlling the inactive Honorius.
Placidia and Valentinian had fled east in the course of these disputes in 422. When, after Honorius’ death, power was seized by a high-ranking member of the western bureaucracy, the zofarius John, the eastern emperor, Theodosius H, eventually decided to back Valentinian and the cause of dynastic unity. Hence, in spring 425, a large eastern force — combining fleet and field army — moved west, and despite the capture of its commander, Ardaburius, quickly put an end to the usurper. Imperial unity was sealed by the betrothal of Valentinian to the three-year-old Licinia Eudoxia, daugh- ter of Theodosius H. The whole sequence of events was recorded in con- siderable detail by the historian Olympiodorus, who brought his story of a twenty-year period of crisis and reconstruction in the western empire to a happy conclusion with Valentinian’s installation.
Thus Olympiodorus, writing from an eastern standpoint (he was, in fact, an eastern diplomat), might well have entitled his work ‘How the West was Won’.' For the landowning Roman élites of the west, however, Valentinian’s installation did little to address a series of problems, whose
' Although we know he liked to refer to the work as ‘raw materials for a history’ (WAy ovyypagys): Photius, Bb/. Lxxx, trans. Blockley, p. 153.
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2 I. THE WESTERN EMPIRE, 425-76
causes were far-reaching indeed. A brief survey of the western empire at the end of 425 both makes clear the fact of imperial disarray and hints at its causes (cf. Fig. 1).
At the periphery, control had been lost altogether. Local Romano-British élites had declared themselves independent of Honortius in ¢. 410, relying, it seems, upon mercenaries from across the North Sea (Angles and Saxons) to assist in their defence. Across the Channel, a similar sequence of events had unfolded in Armorica (broadly speaking, modern Brittany) at more or less the same time (Zos. v1.5.3). Although central imperial control was in the process of being restored there by 417, north-western Gaul remained, as we shall see, a centre of separatist tendencies. In the south-west, the Goths whom we know as Visigoths had been settled by formal treaty in Aquitaine — the Garonne valley between Bordeaux and Toulouse — in 416 and/or 418.2 They likewise remained assertive of their own interests, exploiting the central power-struggles of the mid 420s, for instance, to besiege Arles (see below). By this date, Arles had replaced Trier as the main seat of imperial power north of the Alps.
Elsewhere, the situation was no less problematic. In eastern Gaul, along the Rhine frontier, while there is no record during 425 of any actual Frankish, Alamannic or Burgundian activity, the ambitions of these peoples (either as whole confederations or by way of their constituent parts) posed a constant threat which would develop in intensity. In 413, for instance, they had supported the Gallic usurper Jovinus against Honorius’ regime,’ and, as we shall see, the crisis of the mid 420s was exploited by all three.
In the Iberian peninsula, likewise, central imperial control was under threat. Groups of Vandals, Alans and Sueves had crossed the Pyrenees in 409. As the chronicler Hydatius put it, “some say September 28th, others October 12th, but it was definitely a Tuesday’ (34[42]). They had subse- quently divided the Hispanic provinces between them, and, although one group of Vandals and many Alans had been destroyed by joint Romano- Gothic campaigns in the second half of the 410s, the Hasding Vandal coali- tion (which also now included many Alans) and the Sueves remained unsubdued in Baetica and Gallaecia respectively. The death of Honorius and its aftermath provided the Vandals, at least, with an opportunity for expansion which they cheerfully accepted. In and around 425, they cap- tured Seville, the capital of Baetica, moved into Carthaginiensis, took the Balearic islands, and even made a first move into Mauretania in North Africa (Hydat. Chron. 77[86]).
Thus, of the western empire’s traditional territories, only the Italian peninsula and its rich and strategically vital North African provinces were
2 See e.g, Wolfram (1988) 170-4 ot Heather, Goths and Romans 220-1. 3 Matthews (1975) ch. 12.
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internal revolt
The Gallic Prefecture
British diocese
1 Britannia |
2 Britannia Il
3 Flavia Caesariensis
4 Maxima Caesariensis
5 Valentia
Gallic diocese Alpes Poeninae Belgica | Belgica II Germania | Germania Il Lugdunensis | Lugdunensis II Lugdunensis III Lugdunensis Senonia Maxima Sequanorum
Diocese of the Seven
Provinces
16 Alpes Maritimae
17 Aquitanica |
18 Aquitanica Il
19 Narbonensis |
20 Narbonensis II
Fig. 1 Threats to the western empire, ¢. 425
“EE
Central control threatened by outside forces (with names)
i SAXONS Ly
Areas lost to central control owing to internal revolt
Central control threatened by
Areas lost to central control owing to outside settlement (with names)
21 Novempopuli
22 Vienensis
Spanish diocese Baetica Baleares Carthaginiensis Gallaecia Lusitania Tarraconensis Tingitania
The Italian Prefecture
Italian, or Annonarian, diocese 30 Aemilia 31 Alpes Cottiae Flaminia et Picenum annonarium Liguria Raetia | Raetia II Venetia et Histria Suburbicarian diocese 37 Apulia et Calabria 38 Campania 39 Corsica
ANGLES AND 4%
SMSO. tHUNS
SSSR 54
750 1000 km
500 miles
Lucania et Bruttium Picenum suburbicarium Roma Samnium Sardinia Sicilia Tuscia et Umbria Valeria
Illyrican diocese
48 Dalmatia Noricum mediterraneum Noricum ripense Pannonia | Pannonia Il Savia Valeria
African diocese Africa Proconsularis Byzacena Mauretania Caesariensis Mauretania Sitifensis Numidia Tripolitania
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4 I. THE WESTERN EMPIRE, 425-76
free from major disruption, or the threat of it, at the moment Valentinian IIT was installed upon the throne. More than that, his installation did not bring to an end the struggle for power in the west; it merely redefined its nature. A six-year-old boy could not actually rule. After 425, no further usurpers tried to seize the throne, but political ambition continued to man- ifest itself in a struggle to exercise the power behind Valentinian’s throne.
Before considering these events, however, one further defining factor in the strategic position of the west at the start of Valentinian’s reign requires brief examination: the Huns. They figured directly, indeed, in the events of 425. Lacking sufficient forces to defeat Theodosius’ army, the usurper John sent one of his trusted supporters, Aetius, to seek Hunnic assistance for his putative regime. The Huns were by this date established on the Great Hungarian Plain of the middle Danube, still, in all likelihood, beyond the imperial frontier marked by the river. Aetius was chosen, it seems, because he had, as a child, spent some time as a hostage among the Huns. Aectius failed to arrive in time to save John, but brought such a large force (said, unbelievably, to have numbered 60,000) that the new rulers of the west had to conciliate rather than destroy him.*
With the Huns, the cast of main characters is assembled and the basic situation established. In 425, the eastern imperial authorities reasserted dynastic unity, but the western empire was far from intact. A mixture of outside forces (Huns, Franks, Alamanni, Burgundians), immigrants (Goths, Vandals, Alans and Sueves) and internal separatist groups (espe- cially in Britain and north-west Gaul) had generated intense and — in the context of the recent past, at least — unprecedented centrifugal pressures. These had been sufficient to detach some areas entirely from the orbit of the imperial centre in Italy, and had disrupted the exercise of central power elsewhere. The unity of the culturally homogeneous Roman landowners of the west — the men by whom and for whom the empire was run — was under severe stress.
Although the workings of the fourth-century empire betray many prob- lems in socio-political and economic organization, there is not the slight- est sign that the empire had been about to collapse under its own weight. The early fifth century saw, however, the sudden intrusion, from 405 onwards, of large numbers of outsiders, organized into a number of rela- tively coherent groupings, into the lands of the western empire. A force of Goths led by Radagaisus invaded Italy in 405/6, the Vandals, Alans and Sueves forced their way across the Rhine in 406, Alaric — attracted by the resulting chaos — brought more Goths to the west in 408, and the Burgundians moved the centre of their power right on to, if not actually within, the Roman frontier at precisely the same time.
+ Refs. as PLRE 11.22.
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THE ERA OF AETIUS, 425-54 5
Why this should have happened has occasioned much debate. To my mind, however, the key to these events is provided by the activities of the Huns. It is well known that their western movements had pushed some of the Goths later led by Alaric across the Danube in 376. What is less well understood is that, as late as the 390s, the centre of Hunnic power still lay north of the Black Sea, well to the east of the Carpathian mountains. By 425, as we have seen, they had moved in force into Hungary, and it was almost certainly in response to this second wave of western Hunnic expan- sion that Goths, Vandals, Alans, Sueves and Burgundians fled across the Roman frontier during the first decade of the fifth century.’ By 425, these intrusions had caused, as we have seen, enormous difficulties for the western empire, which the installation of Valentinian II] in 425 did nothing in itself to solve.
I. THE ERA OF AETIUS 425-54
The half-century of imperial history covered by this chapter can be divided into two roughly equal parts, the watershed marked by the death of Aetius. This is no artificial divide. The nearly thirty years of Aetius’ prominence were characterized by a very different mode of political operation from the last two decades of the western empirte’s existence after his death. Broadly speaking, Aetius was able to pursue a more traditional line of policy towards the immigrant groups who had forced their way into the western empire than was possible in the circumstances faced by his successors.
1. Lhe struggle for power 425-33
The main contenders for power in the years after 425 were the leaders of three of the main army groups in the west: Felix, senior magister militum prae- sentalis and commander in Italy, Boniface, commander in Africa, and Aetius, commander in Gaul. The latter post was Aetius’ pay-off for not using his Hunnic army against Valentinian’s eastern forces in 425. Felix, it seems, made the first move. Accusing Boniface of disloyalty, he ordered the latter to return to Italy in 427. When Boniface refused, Felix sent a force to North Africa, but it was defeated. Then Aetius stepped in. On the back of mili- tary success against both Visigoths (426) and Franks (428), Aetius felt confident enough to move against Felix. Perhaps these successes had attracted political support from Valentinian’s mother, Galla Placidia, and other key members of the court. They certainly secured for Aetius a trans- fer to Italy and promotion to the post of junior magister militum praesentalis. The surviving soutces are too thin for us to be certain of the exact course
> Heather (1995) 5—r9.
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6 I. THE WESTERN EMPIRE, 425-76
of events, but in May 430 Aetius had Felix and his wife arrested for plot- ting against him. They were quickly executed at Ravenna.
A decisive encounter with Boniface was not long delayed. As the strug- gle between Aetius and Felix played itself out, Boniface was attempting to deal with the Vandals who had crossed from Spain to North Africa in 429. Although Aetius had successfully undermined Felix, he clearly lost ground at court in the early 430s. Perhaps other court politicians, such as Galla Placidia, did not want to fall entirely under Aetius’ control. Thus Boniface was recalled to Rome in 432, seemingly in Aetius’ absence, and promoted magister militum praesentalis. Aetius was quick to respond. Marching to Italy with an army, he met Boniface in battle near Rimini. Boniface was victori- ous, forcing Aetius to flee, but was himself mortally wounded in the action and died soon afterwards. The post of magister militum praesentalis passed to his son-in-law Sebastianus.
Aetius, however, had other resources upon which to draw. He first retreated to his country estates but, after an attempt was made on his life, he turned (as he did in 425) to the Huns. In 433, he returned to Italy with sufficiently large Hunnic reinforcements to cause Sebastianus to flee to Constantinople, where he remained until 444. Aetius became senior magys- ter militum praesentalis. By the end of 433, therefore, both of Aetius’ main rivals had been defeated, and his position in the west was unchallenged. On 5 September 435, he adopted the title Patricius to express his pre-eminence. Valentinian, perhaps wisely, continued to take no active part in the strug- gles going on around him. By a combination of assassination, battle and luck, Aetius had gained control of the western empire.
Fierce struggles, with death the likely price of failure, were hardly a new phenomenon in imperial politics. Once semi-autonomous outside groups had established themselves on imperial territory, however, the paralysis that such struggles caused at the centre resulted in other dangers too. In the era of Aetius, most of the immigrants were content to operate within a political and ideological framework which accepted the existence of the Roman empire. According to circumstance, they sought Roman commands and dig- nities, married into the imperial family (Galla Placidia’s first husband was Alaric’s successor, Athaulf), or sponsored usurpations, rather than attempt- ing to carve out their own entirely independent states.° Ostensible respect for romanitas never prevented the immigrants, however, from looking to extend their own particular niche within the empire. Hence the struggle of the three generals between 425 and 433 further loosened the bonds of central control.
° Cf. Athaulf’s famous remark that he had first thought to replace Romania with Gothia, but then decided to use Gothic military power to sustain the empire: Oros. vi1.43.2-3. On the ambitions of Alaric and Athaulf, see Heather, Goths and Romans 215-17, 219-24. Burgundians and Alans supported the usurpation of Jovinus (p. 2 above), and the Vandal Gunderic seems to have supported a usurpation in Spain (PLRE 11.745).
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THE ERA OF AETIUS, 425-54 7
As we have seen, the Goths of Aquitaine threatened Arles, the second city of the empire, in 426. A second revolt against Roman power led by a Gothic noble, Anaolsus, unfolded in 430, but this was perhaps the unsanc- tioned, independent action of an autonomous sub-leader. The Vandals were even more active. In the mid 420s, they first dramatically expanded their range of action in the Iberian peninsula, and then in 429 took the deci- sive step of crossing e” masse to Mauretania in North Africa. With their departure, the Sueves were free to extend their attacks on the Roman pop- ulation of Gallaecia in both 430 and 431 (Hydat. Chron. 81[91], 86[96]). Rhenish groups, likewise, exploited the power vacuum. Counterattacks are recotded against the Franks in 428 and 432, and, in 430 and 431, the Alamanni raided across the frontier.
All this directly threatened the empire’s survival. To put it simply, the Roman state taxed the agricultural production of its dependent territories to pay for a powerful army and a political-cum-administrative establish- ment.’ Any loss of territory through permanent annexation or temporary damage in warfare thus meant loss of revenue and a weakening of the state machine. The pragmatic realization on the part of immigrant leaders that, in the early fifth century, the Roman state was still the most powerful polit- ical and military force of its day, and hence demanded some show of def- erence, did not make them any less assertive of independent political interests, nor those interests any less inimical to the Roman state.®
Moreover, any weakening of the Roman state (permanent or temporary) had the more insidious effect of breaking down ties between local Roman élites and the imperial centre. Again reducing the matter to basics, it can be said that the late Roman élite consisted of a geographically widespread class of local landowners, who also participated in imperial institutions. They did so because the Roman state offered protection and legitimation of their position at home and, via imperial careers, substantial additional opportunities for making money and acquiring influence. This extra wealth and power, together with the lifelong rights and privileges which were part and parcel of an imperial career, further strengthened the landowners’ position within their local societies.’
When, because of the appearance of outside military forces, the Roman state was no longer in a position to sustain local élites (and hence to constrain their loyalties, either), the whole point of their attachment to the empire dis- appeared. As a result, they had to look elsewhere for props to their position, notably to whichever barbarian immigrant group was currently most power- ful in their own locality. For some, perhaps those with most invested in the imperial system, the process of psychological adjustment to the decline of
T On its workings: Jones LRE ch. 13. Structural importance: Wickham (1984).
8 For a different view, Goffart (1981) 295 ff. and Goffart (1989) 93ff. ° On careers, Matthews, (1975) ch. 1 and passinz, Heather (1994) 25 ff.
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8 I. THE WESTERN EMPIRE, 425-76
imperial power was naturally slow (see further pp. 29-30 below); for others, such switches of loyalty could happen quickly. In Gaul in the early 4108, for instance, Athaulf attracted considerable support from local landowning élites. They saw good relations with the militarily powerful Goths as the best means, in changed circumstances, of preserving the essential fabric of their lives — above all, their property.’? An alternative response to the same problem, and equally damaging to the interests of the imperial centre, was self-assertion. As we have seen, in Britain and Armorica local élites of a more determined and martial character had attempted to take responsibility for their own defence as early as the 410s,'' and there may have been similar sep- aratist movements in Vindelicia and Noricum in 430.'* The central power vacuum of the 420s and early 430s thus gave complete freedom to a whole range of forces which posed a direct threat to the Roman state.
2. Years of hope 434-9
Once his position was secure, Aetius was able to take direct action to restore the situation. As we have seen, even during his struggles with Felix and Boniface, he had won some victories over the Franks and Goths. After 434, he pushed the policy forward with greater vigour. Defeating Roman rivals before tackling the barbarian threat might seem the wrong order of priorities. But political crisis does not suspend personal ambition; in fact, it often provides a genuine pretext for a quarrel. And to combat the grave threats now facing the empire, any leader needed to deploy the full range of imperial resources — particularly, of course, on the military front. Aetius’ main military successes again came in Gaul. In 436, the Goths revolted again and, moving south and east, laid siege to Narbonne. This was no small-scale raid, and it took Aetius three years to restore some order. His main commander in the region was the dux Litorius, who operated with an army primarily of Huns. The Goths suffered considerable losses in 437/8, but in 439 Litorius was himself defeated, captured and killed near Toulouse. There followed a renewal of the treaty of 418. Despite the loss of Litorius, Aetius had prevented the Goths from making any further gains. More suc- cesses came against the Franks (among whom unrest had broken out in 432). Perhaps more worrying was the extensive revolt of so-called bagaudae led by one Tibatto in 435. It began in Armorica (where, as we have seen, there had been trouble before) and spread more widely through Gaul. In 437, however, Tibatto was captured and the revolt suppressed. Aetius also enjoyed great success against the Burgundians. Since the first decade of the fifth century, they had been established right on the Roman frontier. They
10 The best illustration of the fundamental importance of secure property is Priscus, ed. Blockley
fr, 11.2, p. 72.504-7. " See e.g. Wood (1984); Van Dam, Leadership and Community pt 1. 2 Chron. Min. 11.22 8.a. 430; Sid. Ap. Carm. v1.23 3-4; cf. Thompson (1956) 35.
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THE ERA OF AETIUS, 425-54 9
are recorded in different sources as suffering heavy defeats in both 436 and 437. The first occasion was explicitly at Aetius’ hands, the second at the hands of the Huns. As we shall see, Aetius may well have organized the Hunnic attack too (if both were not part of one and the same campaign). In the Iberian peninsula, Aetius’ approach was less direct, but not, it seems, unsuccessful. The Sueves were still harassing the Gallaecians, and Aetius responded to requests for help by sending embassies in 433 and 438 (Hydat. Chron. 88[98]; 91[100]; 105[113]). A panegyric of Aetius does record a mili- tary intervention in Spain by one of his subordinates, but there is no record of this in the writings of the Hispano-Roman chronicler Hydatius.'4 Whatever the case, the second embassy seems to have persuaded the Sueves to make peace, not least, one presumes, because by the latter date Aetius had already enjoyed considerable military success in Gaul.
Apart from the indigenous resources of the western empire, Aetius drew on two outside sources of assistance in these years. The first was the eastern empire. In 431, initially in support of Boniface (whom the east may have backed in the struggle with Aetius), an eastern army under Aspar came to North Africa to combat the Vandals. According to Procopius (Wars 111.3.36), Aspar left North Africa for Constantinople after being defeated by the Vandals, and before Boniface’s death in battle against Aetius (432). He was still in Carthage on 1 January 434, however, by which time Aetius was securely established in power in Italy, so that a working relationship was probably established between Aspar and Aetius. It also seems likely that Aspat brokered the peace treaty with the Vandals in 435, which saw them settled in relatively poor areas of Mauretania and the Numidian coast (Fig. 2).'° Constantinople thus continued to take an active interest in western affairs, and, if eastern forces were unable to defeat the Vandals, they did enough to exclude them from the richest North African provinces of Proconsularis and Byzacena.
Second, Aetius drew very heavily on Hunnic military manpower, which he presumably paid for in hard cash. The Huns had been his trump card in internal imperial political disputes in both 425 and 433.'° From the mid 430s onwards, Aetius also used them extensively in Gaul, where they were responsible both for crushing the Armorican bagaudae and for much of the campaign against the Visigoths.'? The Huns also savaged the Burgundians in 437, an event organized — according to some of our soutces, at least — by Aetius, and which preceded a resettlement of the sur- vivors within the Roman frontier.'*
3 Refs. as PLRE 11.24~5. Secondary accounts: Mommsen, (1901) 523; Stein (1959) 322ff.; Zecchini (1983) ch. 9. 4 Merobaud. Pan. fr. 11a 22-3; Jord. Get. 176; cf. PLRE 11.25.
'5 Sources: PLRE 11.166; cf. Courtois (1955) 155—71. 16 Refs. as PLRE 11.234.
7 Refs, as PLRE 11.684-5.
'8 Refs. as PLRE 11.523. On Aetius’ role: Stein (1959) 323; O’Flynn (1983) 89 n. 4.
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10 I. THE WESTERN EMPIRE, 425-76
Y ‘ Z \ SX AGS ij
2 TINGITANTAS MAURETANIA r re / NUM iy YN CAESARIENSIS —! Ry i
oS ii
“ @.
600 km
Vandal possessions A.D. 435
4 Vandal possessions A.D. 439 400 miles
Fig. 2 Vandal and Alan settlements in North Africa
In the later 430s, therefore, Aetius restored some order to the western empire. Britain did not return to the fold, although substantial contacts of a more informal nature clearly continued between Romano-Britons and their continental counterparts. The two famous visits to the island of bishop Germanus of Auxerre in 429 and (probably) the early 440s are likely to be no more than the tip of a substantial iceberg. Otherwise, indigenous and immigrant revolts in Gaul were suppressed, and Rhine frontier groups defeated. The Sueves were kept within reasonable bounds in north-western Spain and, with eastern help, the Vandals confined to the poorer North African provinces. This last point is worth stressing, for Aetius has been criticized in modern times for concentrating on Gaul at the expense of the richer and strategically more defensible provinces of North Africa. Ties between Italian and southern Gallic élites were very strong, however, and Aetius had made his name in Gaul. Abandoning the latter would have been politically impossible, therefore, and it was far from an unreasoanble line of policy to rely on eastern help to retain the most valuable African prov- inces. In many ways, the most striking aspect of Aetius’ success is the role played by the Huns. Not only did they rescue him from political defeat in both 425 and 432, but were also central to his military success in Gaul. With Hunnic and eastern imperial assistance, therefore, Aetius succeeded in creating a precarious balance of power in the 430s, which, at least to some extent, checked the process of political fragmentation in the west.
3. Lhe loss of Africa and after, 439-49
An already difficult situation was pushed into acute crisis, however, when in 439 the Vandals marched into Carthage to take possession of the richest
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THE ERA OF AETIUS, 425-54 II
provinces of North Africa.!” These lands were crucial to the empire, not least in feeding the population of Rome. The Vandals also followed up this success by exploiting to full effect the maritime expertise available in the city. Early in 440 a large Vandal fleet left Carthage, and landed on, and dev- astated, large parts of another major revenue centre of the western empire: Sicily. Both east and west reacted swiftly to the Vandals’ new capacities. The maritime defences of Rome and Constantinople were immediately strengthened,” and plans were laid to restore the situation. That eastern help was on its way was announced by Aetius as early as June 440, but, given all the logistic problems (cf. C/ x11.8.2; 50.21), a counter-expedition could not be ready before the campaigning season of 441. At the start of the year, a combined force from east and west gathered in Sicily, the eastern troops, under the command of Areobindus, having been drawn from the Danube frontier.?! _In many ways, this crisis was the acid test of whether Aetius’ efforts could really hold the line against political fragmentation in the west ot were merely slowing it down. Unfortunately for the western empire, the expedition went no further than Sicily. A critical change had occurred in the political stance of the Huns.
By ¢. 440, the Hunnic empire was approaching the apogee of its power, under Attila and (at first) his brother Bleda. This was the end result, it seems, of related processes, which saw both the increasing centralization of power among the Huns and continuing conquests of other tribes. Between them, these transformations brought unprecedented numbers of different subjects under the direct control of individual Hunnic leaders.” Because of this greater strength, Hunnic leaders could widen the scope of their ambitions, and Aetius’ old policy of using them against unwanted immigrants on Roman soil collapsed.” As the joint east-west Vandal expe- dition gathered in Sicily, Attila and Bleda launched their first major invasion across the Danube. Exploiting a variety of pretexts, the Huns crossed the river in force, capturing the cities of Viminacium and Margus. Smaller-scale raiding extended over a wider area.”*
One direct result of this sequence of events was that North Africa was secured for the Vandals. Many of the eastern troops in Sicily had been drafted from the Danube frontier and, because of the Huns, had to return. In consequence, Aetius was forced in 442 to acknowledge by treaty the
Courtois (1955) 171ff. 20 Nov. Val. 5.3; Chron. Pasch. ad a. 439 = Chron. Min, 11.80.
21 Best account: Maenchen-Helfen (1973) 108ff.; cf. Stein (1959) 324~5; Zecchini (1983) 171ff.
22 See further Mommsen (1901) 524-6; Thompson (1996) 26ff.; Harmatta (1952) 292ff.; Maenchen- Helfen (1973) 94ff.; cf. ch. 23 (Whitby), pp. 704-8 below.
23 Cf. amongst others Mommsen (1901) 526; Stein (1959) 334-5. This has perhaps also been the policy of Fl. Constantius: Heather (1995) 26.
4 The sources for Attila’s campaigns of the 440s have prompted two alternative chronological reconstructions. In general, I prefer Maenchen-Helfen (1973) 108ff. to Thompson (1996) 86ff. The question turns on the reliability of a notice provided by the Byzantine chronicler Theophanes; cf. Heather (1996) 252.
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12 I. THE WESTERN EMPIRE, 425-76
A
Co fiveo A GALTeeCls dLeon Se ‘Astorga> sn TARRACONENSI
Controlled by Suevi at the end of 441
SCALE 0 50 100 150 200 250 km
0 50 100 150 miles
Fig. 3 Suevic expansion in Spain, ¢. 440-4
Vandals’ latest conquests. In this agreement, Aetius recognized their control over Proconsular Africa, Byzacena and western Numidia. He received back the poorer and now devastated provinces previously ceded to the Vandals in 435.7
In the meantime, imperial control had suffered further setbacks in Spain. In the wake of Geiseric’s seizure of Carthage, the Sueves, under a new king, Rechila, took advantage of Aetius’ preoccupation with North Africa to expand their dominion. In 439, they moved out of Gallaecia to take the main city of Lusitania, Mérida. In 440, they captured Censurius, Aetius’ commander and main representative in the peninsula. In 441, they took Seville and extended their control over the whole of Baetica and Carthaginiensis (Fig. 3).°° Imperial control was further undermined by a series of bagaudic uprisings, particularly in Tarraconensis, the one province
5 Maenchen-Helfen (1973) 108ff.; Courtois (1955) 173ff. Taxes in the returned provinces were reduced to an eighth: Now. Val. 13.
26 Hydat. Chron. 119 (capture of Merida: a.. 439), 121—3 (fall of Seville, Baetica and Carthaginiensis: A.D. 440-1), Chron. Min. 11.234.
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THE ERA OF AETIUS, 425-54 13
still under direct imperial control from the centre. As in Gaul, these uptis- ings would seem to have represented assertions of local against central imperial power. At least one of the revolts, that led by Basilius in Tyriaso (Tirasona) in 449, seems to have favoured a Suevic take-over of the prov- ince.*’ After Censurius’ capture, a succession of imperial commanders were sent to the region: Asturius in 442, Merobaudes in 443 and Vitus in 446. Asturius and Merobaudes had to concentrate on defeating bagaudae, pre- sumably to maintain imperial control in Tarraconensis (Hydat. Chron. 117[125]; 120[128]). Vitus’ brief was more ambitious. Repeating the strategy of the 410s, he led a combined Roman and Gothic force into Carthaginiensis and Baetica to restore broader imperial control in the peninsula. Hydatius complains bitterly about the logistic demands the army made upon local Hispano-Romans, but this complaint was perhaps dictated by the expedi- tion’s outcome. When Vitus’ force met the Sueves in battle, it was routed (Hydat. Chron. 126[134]). After 446, Hydatius records no further imperial military initiatives in the peninsula, and, in alliance with local groups, the Sueves began to make headway even in Tarraconensis.
Of Gaul in the 440s we know comparatively little. In the south-west, at least, Aetius’ successes of the 430s were enough to keep the Goths quiet. No revolt of any kind is mentioned, and they contributed to Vitus’ Spanish venture of 446. Elsewhere, imperial control did not go unchallenged. Armorica continued to present particular difficulties. Aetius seems to have established a group of Alans, under Goat, in the region in 442 to discou- rage rebellion. This did not prevent trouble from breaking out again in 448 — apparently because of the Alanic settlement — but, once again, the bagau- dae were suppressed.** Whether the same reasoning underlay Aetius’ deci- sion to settle Burgundians in Savoy, in south-eastern Gaul, is unclear. This has sometimes been argued, but it is also possible that the Burgundians, heavily defeated by combined Romano-Hunnic action in the mid 430s, were refugees from the power of Bleda and Attila (repeating the pattern of eatlier frontier penetrations in 376 and 406). Whatever the case, Aetius supervised their installation in Savoy in 443 (Chron. Gall. 452 no. 128= Chron. Min. 11). On the Rhine frontier, we hear only of a Frankish attack on Arras which Aetius himself beat off, probably in 448. Control was thus sub- stantially maintained in Gaul, but the loss of North Africa had plunged the western empire into acute financial crisis.
Such a crisis had been in the offing since the first decade of the century. Any territory caught up in warfare, annexed outright by ambitious barbar- ian kings or turned independent, involved temporary or permanent losses of revenue to the central Roman state. No more revenues came from
27 Hydat. Chron. 133-4 [142], where Basilius firsts acts independently, and then helps the Suevic king Rechiarius to plunder Saragossa (Caesaraugusta). 8 Refs. as PLRE 11.26-7.
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14 I. THE WESTERN EMPIRE, 425-76
Britain after ¢. 410, and Spanish revenues must have been entirely lost for most of the 410s and were only partially restored thereafter. Parts of Gallaecia remained in Suevic hands throughout the fifth century, and the Vandals remained very active (sometimes attacking the Sueves, sometimes pillaging the Hispano-Romans) until they left Spain in 429.” It is also unlikely that much tax was raised in war-torn Gaul either in the 410s or the 4308. Moreover, substantial tax remissions had sometimes to be granted to areas caught up in fighting. After Alaric’s Goths left Italy, Honorius reduced the land-tax of the eight Suburbicarian provinces to one-fifth of their normal level in 413, and, after a further five years, the taxes of Picenum and Tuscia to one-seventh, and those of Campania to one-ninth.*”
The western empire’s tax base had thus suffered substantial losses — both temporary and permanent — even before 439. Not surprisingly, tax-payers in those areas which did remain under central control seem to have faced ever- increasing burdens. It has been argued, for instance, that in 440 western tax tates were twice as high as those prevailing in the east even a century later.*! When, in addition, the west lost control of its richest assets to the Vandals, and of other worthwhile ones to the Sueves, a bad situation was made incomparably worse. The legislation of Aetius’ regime from the 440s shows unmistakable signs of the consequent financial stress. In 444, an imperial law claimed that plans for a larger army were being frustrated by revenues which were not large enough even to feed and clothe the existing troops. This state- ment was used to justify the introduction of the séiquaticum, a new sales-tax of about four per cent.*” Just a few months previously, many bureaucrats had lost their exemptions from the recruitment tax (Now Val. 6.3 of 14 July 444), and other efforts had been made in 440 and 441 to cut back on tax privileges and corruption. The regime was thus desperate enough for cash to increase taxes for the landowning, bureaucratic classes on which it depended for political support.*? The precarious balance of power established by Aetius in the 430s had been undermined, primarily because of the Huns’ expan- sionary ambitions. Further twists in the Hunnic saga, in the late 440s and eatly 450s, would totally destroy it, and with it Aetius himself.
4. Attila and after, 449-54
Although unable to reverse the situation in Africa or the gains made by the Sueves in Spain, for most of the 440s the west did not, at least, have to deal
2) Fg, Hydat. Chron. 71, 75, 86, 89-90, Chron. Min, 11.20-1; cf. Thompson (1977).
3° CTh. x1.28.7, 12. After Vandal attacks, the taxes of Sicily were similarly reduced to a seventh: Nov. Val. 1.2 (440). 31 Jones, LRE 464 n. 128, deduced from Nov. Val. 5.4.
32 Nov. Val. 15 of September 444 to January 445; cf. Non Val. 24 of 447.
3 Privileges: Nou Val. 10.1 (A.D. 441), 10.1.3. Corruption: Non Val. 7.1-2 (a.v. 440 and 442). Unjustified exemptions: Nov. Val. 4 and 10 (440 and 441). Stein (1959) 337-8 argued from these laws that Aetius conspired with leading landowners to keep the land-tax down against the interests of the state. On this point, see Twyman (1970); Zecchini (1983) ch. 10; and, more generally, Weber (1989).
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THE ERA OF AETIUS, 425-54 15
directly with Attila’s ambitions. Sometime before 449, presumably under duress, Aetius had ceded the Pannonian province of Savia to the Huns (Priscus fr. 7; Blockley fr. 11.1). By the same date, Attila was also enjoying the rank of honorary magister militum of the western empire, with its atten- dant salary (Priscus fr. 8; Blockley fr. 11.2, p. 278.627—31). The circum- stances of these concessions ate unknown. In the meantime, Attila had concentrated on the Balkan possessions of the eastern empire, where he won huge victories in 441/2 and (probably) 447.** In the late 440s, however, Attila turned his attention westward.
Scandals within the royal family provided him with a pretext. The emperor Valentinian’s sister, Honoria, conceived a child, we ate told, as the result of an unsuitable love affair with one Eugenius, the manager of her estates. Eugenius was executed and Honoria placed in custody. To prevent further scandal she was subsequently betrothed to a trustworthy senator called Herculanus. At this point, she seems to have written to Attila offering him half the western empire as a dowry if he would rescue and marry her. In 449 or 450, consequently, Attila made a formal demand, based on the letter, and threatened war. What we should make of this is hard to know. The story appears in a wide variety of sources, and the fact of Honoria’s disgrace seems securely enough established.*° The likelihood is, however, that Attila (having probably exhausted the possibilities of immediate gains in the east) was in any case planning a western campaign, or series of campaigns.
Indeed, Attila carefully prepared the ground for a major western move, and Honoria was not his only pretext. In the summer of 449, western ambassadors were sent to Attila to answer his charge that a Roman banker called Silvanus was in possession of gold plate which was Attila’s by right. The issue was trivial, but Attila threatened war if it was not settled as he wished (Priscus fr. 8; Blockley fr. 11.2, pp. 263, 265, 277). This might have been an autocrat’s megalomania, but, given its context, I would take it as another sign that Attila wanted to press a quarrel with the west. Diplomatically, too, the ground was carefully prepared. In the summer of 450, Outstanding issues in Attila’s relations with Constantinople were settled on terms which the historian Priscus regarded as favourable to the eastern empire (frr. 13-14; Blockley fr. 15.3—4). Attila’s generosity suggests that he was keen to secure his eastern front, presumably with a western campaign in mind.* At the same time, he was interfering in the west, not least in an attempt to sow discord among its different constituent powers. There are vague records of some kind of contact between Attila and Geiseric, who is said to have bribed Attila to turn his armies westwards. One of the leaders of the recently defeated bagaudae, the doctor Eudoxius, had fled to the Huns in 448. His reception may suggest that Attila foresaw
34 T would generally follow Maenchen-Helfen (1973) 108ff. (cf. p. 11 above, n. 24). For details, see
ch. 2 (Lee), pp. 41-2, and ch. 23 (Whitby), pp. 704-12 below. > For further details with refs., Thompson (1996) 145-6. 36 Cf. Thompson (1996) 143.
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40°N
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Map 1 The Roman world of the fifth and sixth century
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THE ERA OF AETIUS, 425-54 17
a possible use for him in fomenting a revolt to ease the path of any Hunnic army operating in the west. Late in 450, likewise, Aetius and Attila backed different candidates for the recently vacant kingship of the Ripuarian Pranks. Every possible opening was thus being exploited by Attila, first, to provoke a quarrel, and, second, to prevent the creation of any united front against him in the west. The diplomatic offensive reached a climax in 451, when, as his forces finally began to march, Attila sent letters both to the western court at Ravenna and to the Visigothic king Theoderic I in Toulouse. To Ravenna, Attila proclaimed that he had come to attack the Visigoths on their behalf. Theoderic was told that the Huns’ quarrel was with Ravenna and he was urged to bring the Goths over to Attila’s side.*” As Jordanes comments: ‘Beneath his ferocity, [Attila] was a subtle man, and fought with craft before he made war’ (Ge#. 36.1856).
At the start of 451, Attila’s expedition moved westwards along the left bank of the Danube. The Rhine was crossed around Mayence, the prov- ince of Belgica ravaged, and the city of Metz burned on 7 April. Towards the end of May, the Huns were encamped around Orleans, when Aetius finally appeared. His army was composed of Roman regulars and a series of detachments from allied peoples. Of these, the most important was Gothic, under the command of their king, Theoderic I. Jordanes also men- tions the presence of Franks, Saxons and Burgundians (Ger. 36.191). The western authorities, it seems, had been expecting an invasion of Italy, and Aetius had had to work extremely hard to make the Goths take the field. Attila’s diplomatic manoeuvrings had nearly worked. On Aetius’ appear- ance, Attila retreated towards the Champagne, where battle was joined on the so-called Catalaunian Plains (or campus Mauriacus) in late June or early July. In a bloody encounter, the Visigothic king was killed, but victory went to Aetius. Attila at first contemplated killing himself, but then withdrew to Pannonia to lick his wounds and prepare another effort.*®
Attila’s second western expedition followed in the next campaigning season, and this time did fall on Italy. Friuli was taken by storm — a victory followed in swift succession by the capture of, amongst others, Aquileia, Padua, Mantua, Verona and Brescia. It was after these successes that the famous encounter between Attila and pope Leo is supposed to have taken place on the river Mincius. Whether it ever occurred is doubtful, and it seems most unlikely that the pope’s persuasion really saved Rome. Aetius has sometimes been criticized for not giving full-scale battle to the Huns, but without bringing the Goths to Italy — a very dangerous move — he lacked sufficient forces. Further, contrary to some interpretations, he does seem to have been harrying the Huns with the troops that were available to
37 On these matters, see Thompson (1996) 143ff.; Clover (1972). 8 Further details: Thompson (1996) 148ff.
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18 I. THE WESTERN EMPIRE, 425-76
him. The new eastern emperor Marcian also launched an attack on Attila’s underprotected homelands, and disease was becoming rife in the invading army. In all probability, a combination of these factors, rather than papal intervention, led Attila to withdraw.*”
On his return to Pannonia, the Hunnic king decided to take another wife. Precisely how many he had it is impossible to ascertain. The wedding took place early in 453, and, as is well known, the great conqueror burst a blood vessel and died in his sleep. His death let loose a vicious struggle for power among his sons, which culminated at the battle of the Nedao in 454 or 455, where his eldest son Ellac died in the conflict. This succession crisis was seized upon by many of the Huns’ subject peoples as an opportunity to throw off the Hunnic yoke. The exact course of events is difficult to recon- struct, but, by the early 460s at the latest, Attila’s composite empire had dis- solved into its constituent parts; Gepids, Goths, Rugi, Heruls and Sueves had all asserted their independence. By the late 460s, the remnants of Attila’s Huns were themselves seeking asylum inside the eastern empire.” This dramatic Hunnic collapse brought in its wake a final crisis for the Roman empire in western Europe.
II. THE FALL OF THE WESTERN EMPIRE
The most immediate effect of the collapse of the Huns was that the emperor Valentinian II, thirty-five years old in 454, felt no further need of Aetius. Aetius himself would seem to have sensed this, since in that year he pressed the emperor into a marriage alliance. Aetius’ son Gaudentius was to marry Valentinian’s daughter Placidia. Since Valentinian had no son, this would have reinforced Aetius’ political pre-eminence by making his son Valentinian’s likely successor. Valentinian, however, resented the move, and there were other western politicians who chafed under Aetius’ long- standing predominance, not least the senator Petronius Maximus who encouraged the emperor to act. Valentinian assassinated Aetius personally, we are told, on 21 or 22 September 454. Valentinian himself was murdered the next March by two of Aetius’ bodyguards." The disappearance from the scene of Aetius, Valentinian and, above all, Attila marked the opening of a new (and final) era in the history of the Roman west.
1. A new political order: Petronius Maximus, Avitus, and after, 455-7
After the collapse of Attila’s empire, it was no longer possible to use Hunnic troops to pursue a policy of military containment towards the
® Further details and full refs.: Thompson (1996) 156ff.; Maenchen-Helfen (1973) 129ff.
40 Maenchen-Helfen (1973) 143ff.; Heather, Goths and Romans 228-9, 246-9; cf. Thompson (1996) ch.6. *! Sources as PLRE 11.28.
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THE FALL OF THE WESTERN EMPIRE 19
immigrants who had established themselves in the western empire since A.D. 400. This policy, though it was the basis of Aetius’ success in the 4308, had broken down anyway in the 440s, when Hunnic ambitions increased. After 453, it ceased altogether to be relevant. Not only was Hunnic power in the process of being extinguished, but the western empire, as we have seen, was itself chronically short of funds and could perhaps no longer have afforded to pay for its assistance. It would probably also have raised political difficulties to re-employ the Huns after the devastation they had so recently caused. As a result, a fundamental change followed in the nature of power politics in the western half of the empire.
The traditional players of the power game — at least at first — remained. The eastern empire continued to play a significant political role; so too did the western Roman military. The Gallic army was prominent, particularly under Aegidius in the 460s,” the Italian army underlay the influence of Ricimer, and the forces of Dalmatia provided a solid power base between 450 and 480 for Marcellinus and his nephew Julius Nepos.* These western army groups had all to be reconciled individually to imperial regimes. In the same way, leading members of the Roman landed élite, especially the sena- tors of Italy and southern Gaul, remained politically important. In contrast to fourth-century career patterns, the fifth century was marked by an unprec- edented tendency for Gallic senators to hold the top jobs in Gaul, and Italian senators those in Italy. Each group also had its own institutional focus. The senate of Rome and the imperial court at Ravenna continued to function as centres for élite political activity in Italy. From 418, the refounded Gallic council did the same for Gallic senatorial élites.“4 There was thus a greater tendency towards the emergence of regional solidarities in the fifth century, though this should not be overstressed. Major families north and south of the Alps remained interrelated, and there is quite as much, if not more, evi- dence for dispute within the ranks of Gallic and Italian senators as between them. Very immediate interests tended to surface, indeed, at moments of ctisis. Sidonius’ resentment that his native Clermont was traded by the emperor Nepos to the Goths in return for Provence is a famous example.” Both the Roman senate and the Gallic council remained as much gatherings of rich, interrelated and politically powerful landowners as forums through which genuinely regional views were expressed.*”
Prom ¢ 450, however, the major autonomous barbarian groups on Roman territory also began to demand and play an increasingly active role
” The comites Nepotianus, Paul and Arbogast also commanded elements of this force between the 450s and the 470s. 8 Cf. Wozniak (1981) 353-63.
# Jobs: Sundwall (1915) 8-9, 21-2; cf. Matthews (1975) esp. 331 ff, 356ff.
45 Matthews (1975) 338ff.; Barnish (1988) 134-5; Mommaerts and Kelly (1992).
46 Sid. Ap. Ep. 7.7: cf. Harries (1995) 236ff.
47 E.g. Max (1979) 225-31; Weber (1989) 491-3. The case for a Gallic—Italian divide as a fundamen- tal factor in political activity has been made by several: e.g. Twyman (1970) 484-7; Mathisen (1981).
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20 I. THE WESTERN EMPIRE, 425-76
in western affairs. This was true, in the first instance, of the Goths and Burgundians of southern Gaul, and the Vandals of North Africa. By the 4708 and 480s, however, they had been joined by groups of Franks, partic- ularly those led by Clovis’ father, Childeric. Previously, Hunnic power was used by Aetius to contain these groups within designated physical boun- daries, and to minimize their political influence. When Hunnic power col- lapsed, the only viable alternative was to include all — or some — of them within the western empire’s body politic. Such a move was already prefigured, indeed, in the great alliance Aetius put together in 451 to defeat Attila on the Catalaunian Plains. The old strategic order was reversed. Instead of the western Roman state using Hunnic power to control the immigrant barbarians, in 451 it allied itself with the immigrants against the Huns.*®
Western imperial politicians clearly understood the new realities. The first move of Petronius Maximus, for instance — the immediate and self- proclaimed successor of Valentinian HI — was to win Gothic support. His close associate Avitus was despatched to Toulouse to court the Visigothic king, Theoderic I.” Perhaps the best example of the sea change in western politics, however, is Avitus himself. While he was still in Toulouse, news came through that Maximus had been killed in the Vandal sack of Rome (May 455). Avitus took his place, being proclaimed emperor first by the Goths and then by Gallo-Roman senators at Arles on 9 July 455. The writ- ings of Sidonius Apollinaris provide us with a fascinating document from these tumultuous months of political reordering. As we have seen, some members of the Roman landowning élite had in the 410s quickly allied themselves to the Goths. Many, however, remained to be convinced that this was an acceptable strategy. Around the time of Avitus’ accession, Sidonius wrote a detailed account of life at the Gothic court. In it, he recotds Theoderic’s natural physical perfection, the ordered, rational pro- cedure of daily business, and the moderation and virtuous nature of the food, drink and entertainment on offer there. Given that the traditional images of ‘barbarians’ in Graeco-Roman ideology were irrationality and sensuality, the letter carries a clear ideological message. Its tone would still appear to be patronizing in places (particularly in its account of the king’s willingness to grant requests if you let him win at board games), but its central theme still rings out clearly. Theoderic was a king close enough to Roman ways of doing things for him to be properly included within the Roman order.
Avitus’ regime quickly took offin Gaul, where it combined Goths, Gallo- Romans and Burgundians, but failed to establish itself in Italy, whose army,
48 A similar analysis: Clover (1978) 171.
# Valentinian III was murdered on 16 March, Petronius Maximus proclaimed on 17 March: PLRE 11.751. Avitus’ mission: Sid. Ap. Carm. v11.392ff.
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THE FALL OF THE WESTERN EMPIRE 21
under Ricimer and Majorian, remained implacably hostile. The eastern empire also withheld its recognition, although it did not go so far as to condemn Avitus as a usurper.*’ And in practice, when Avitus advanced into Italy in 456, Ricimer’s forces were powerful enough to defeat him, at the battle of Placentia on 17 October. In the aftermath, Avitus resigned to become bishop of Placentia, and died soon after. The manner of his defeat is indicative. Most subsequent western imperial regimes took the form of Ricimer plus a variety of frontmen; Ricimer himself never sought the throne. This would suggest that the Italian army he commanded was too powerful for any western regime to function without it as a central player. Nevertheless, Ricimet’s army was not by itself sufficient to control areas outside Italy, and every imperial regime after Valentinian HI also attempted to include other Roman army groups, senators (Gallo-Roman and Italian) and, from among the barbarians, at least the Goths and Burgundians.
Regimes largely independent of the immigrant groups, of the kind which had prevailed earlier in the century, thus gave way, after 450, to regimes which included them. This fundamental change in the nature of political activity had important consequences. No group of supporters was ready (nor previously had any of the more traditional power blocs ever been ready) to back a regime without some kind of pay-off. One effect of including immigrants in governing coalitions, therefore, was to increase the numbers of those expecting rewards.
The most obvious reward sought by, and given to, the leaders of immi- grant groups was involvement in the running of the empire. Burgundian kings took Roman titles, for instance, while the Visigoth Theoderic I attempted to order affairs in Spain.°! The Vandals’ intervention in Italy in 45 5 should also be read as an attempt to stake a claim in the new political order. That they sacked the city of Rome has naturally received most attention, but Geiseric, the Vandal leader, also took back to North Africa with him Eudoxia and Eudocia — respectively, the widow and daughter of Valentinian III. Geiseric subsequently married the daughter to his son and heir, Huneric. The two had been betrothed, but not married, under the treaty of 442 (see p. 11 above), but, on assuming the throne in 455, Petronius Maximus married Eudocia to his son, the Caesar Palladius, instead. Thus Geiseric intervened in Italy at least partly because a match which should have cemented the Vandals’ place in the new political order of the west appeared to have been thwarted. Subsequently, Geiseric would also attempt to forward the imperial claims of Olybrius who married Placidia, the younger daughter of Valentinian, and was thus his relative by marriage.”
°° Refs. as PLRE 11.198; cf. Mathisen (1981) 233-4.
| The Burgundian kings Gundioc and Gundobad were both magister militum per Gallias. PLRE 11.5234. Goths in Spain: p. 22 below, n. 54.
Clover (1978) 193ff; cf. generally Clover (1989a), (1989b).
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22 I. THE WESTERN EMPIRE, 425-76
Involvement in imperial affairs carried great prestige, and had been sought by immigrant leaders since the time of Alaric and Athaulf. The western empire only had this prestige, however, because it was, and was perceived to be, the most powerful institution of its day. Prestige certainly incorporates abstract qualities, but the attraction of the living empire for immigrant leaders was firmly based upon its military might and overall wealth. They wished to avoid potentially dangerous military confrontations with it, while its wealth, when distributed as patronage, could greatly strengthen a leader’s position. By the 450s, however, the reality of power behind the western imperial facade was already slipping. Britain, parts of Gaul and Spain (at different times) and, above all, North Africa had removed themselves, or been removed, from central imperial control. The rewards — wealth in the form of money or land, wealth being the basis of power — given after 454 to new allies from among the barbarian immi- grants were granted, therefore, from an already shrunken base. And, of course, the very process of rewarding caused further shrinkage.
Take, for example, Avitus. Under him, the Goths were sent to Spain to bring the Sueves to heel. In contrast to the position in the 410s, however, Theoderic I’s troops seem to have operated by themselves and, by Hydatius’ account, basically ransacked northern Spain, including its loyal Hispano-Romans, of all the wealth they could force their victims to produce. This benefited the Goths, but not the western Roman state. There is no indication that Roman administration and taxation were restored by their actions to any lost territories. Likewise the Burgundians: after participating in the Spanish campaign (Jord. Ger. 44.231), they received new and better lands in Savoy. An enigmatic chronicle entry tells us that they divided them with local senators. Another prosperous agricultural area no longer formed part of central imperial resources.”
After 454, there thus built up a vicious circle within the western empire: too many groups squabbling over a shrinking financial base. With every change of regime, there had to be further gifts. Having been granted a free hand in Spain under Avitus, the Goths then received the city of Narbonne and its territory (presumably especially its tax revenues) as the price of their support for Libius Severus in the early 460s (see below).*° Even worse, this concentration on the internal relations of established power blocs allowed the rise of other, more peripheral forces, such as the Franks. In previous eras, this would have been prevented by direct military and diplomatic
°3 The point is unaffected by whether the Roman state granted these groups land or tax proceeds, a subject of recent debate. Some major contributions are Goffart, Barbarians and Romans, and Dutliat (1988) (both arguing, with slight differences, in favour of allocations of tax revenue); Barnish (1986) and Wood (1990) (arguing the case for a land settlement in, respectively, Italy and Savoy).
4 Hydat. Chron. 170, 172-5, 186, Chron. Min. 11.28-9.
55 Mar. Avent. ad a. 456.2, Chron. Min. 11.232; cf. Auct. Prosp. Haun. s.a. 457, Chron. Min. 1.305; cf. Wood (1990) 65-9. 56 Hydat. Chron. 217, Chron. Min. 11.33.
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THE FALL OF THE WESTERN EMPIRE 23
action. The activities of Franks and other parvenus took still more terri- tory out of central control. Particularly ominous in this respect was the expansion of the Armoricans and, above all, the Franks in northern Gaul from the 46os.°” The dangers inherent in the new political order were thus profound. Centrifugal forces could not be transformed into centripetal ones merely by throwing around a few Roman titles.
2. Attempts at equilibrium, 457-68
The deposition of Avitus in October 456 was followed by an interregnum. It was not until 28 December 457 that Majorian was declared Augustus at Ravenna. The new emperor had served under Aetius and was brought back from retirement by Valentinian III, after Aetius’ murder, to help reconcile the latter’s troops. As early as 455 he was being talked of as a potential emperor, and, although he worked closely with Ricimer against Avitus, Majorian was clearly no mere puppet of the Italian army’s generalissimo (unlike many of his successors). The delay between Avitus’ deposition and Majorian’s election was taken up with delicate negotiations, winning support for his candidacy not only in the west but also from Marcellinus, the army commander in Dalmatia, and from Constantinople. Majorian eventually took the throne with the backing of the eastern emperor Leo I.**
Majorian’s four-year reign is marked by determined efforts to restore order in the west. In the letters of Sidonius, considerable evidence survives of the efforts he made to woo Gallic aristocrats. In 458, Majorian pro- gressed through southern Gaul and, employing a mixture of force and gen- erosity, attempted to heal the divisions created by Avitus’ defeat.°? Sidonius, at least, was won over. He composed and delivered a panegyric in the new emperor’s favout, receiving in return a minor official post. Majorian’s mili- tary forces were also active outside Italy. Of his commanders’ activities, we know that Aegidius in Gaul fought both Franks and Goths. The latter engagement, at least, would seem to have been successful, since Gothic forces later assisted Nepotianus, another of Majorian’s commanders, to curb Suevic activities in north-western Spain. In 461, however, Majorian attempted to invade Vandal Africa via Spain and was heavily defeated (see below). This provided Ricimer with an opportunity which he was quick to take. He formally deposed Majorian on 2 August 461, and had him exe- cuted five days later.
57 Franks: James (1988a) 64ff. Armorica may have seen substantial immigration from Britain (e.g. Riothamus: PLRE 11.945), on top of an indigenous population which had already shown separatist ten- dencies: p. 8 above.
8 Stein (1959) 374-53 Max (1979) 234-6; O’Flynn (1983) 185-6 n. 18. Marcellinus took part in Majorian’s Vandal expedition (PLRE 11.709). °° Mathisen (1979).
® Refs. PLRE 11.12 and 778, cf. O'Flynn (1983) 106ff.
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24 I. THE WESTERN EMPIRE, 425-76
The next western emperor, Libius Severus, was much more Ricimert’s puppet. He was proclaimed emperor on 19 November 461, and, once again, determined efforts were made to win support for him throughout the remaining Roman west. The Goths, for instance, were granted Narbonne in return for their support, and Ricimer had close relations with the Burgundian royal house, which guaranteed their adherence to the new regime. The murder of Majorian and the ceding of Narbonne, however, prompted a major revolt from elements of the Gallo-Roman military under Aegidius. The year 463 thus saw the interesting, if confus- ing, spectacle of a western emperor employing Goths to attack part of the Roman army in Gaul. When battle was joined at Orleans, Aegidius was victorious. His revolt was only contained in the autumn of 465, when he was assassinated. At the time, he was engaged in negotiations with the Vandal king Geiseric, trying to construct an alternative balance of western forces to challenge Ricimer’s domination. Severus’ regime also failed to win eastern approval; he was never recognized by the emperor Leo. Ricimer may eventually have poisoned Severus (he died on 14 November 465).°! If so, it was presumably because Severus had become an obstacle to Ricimer’s continued negotiations with the east. It is perhaps significant that major developments in the east-west relations followed Severus’ death.
The next western imperial regime, for instance, was clearly the product of careful negotiation between Ricimer and Leo. In spring 467, again fol- lowing an interregnum, a successful eastern general by the name of Anthemius advanced into Italy with Leo’s support. He brought with him military forces which probably consisted, in large measure, of the Dalmatian troops of Marcellinus. Ricimer too was ready to accept Anthemius, and even married his daughter, Alypia. Gallic landowners, as in the time of Majorian, were carefully courted, and Goths and Burgundians, at least in the first instance, were ready to defer to him.°? On 12 April 467, therefore, Anthemius was proclaimed western emperor. The central plank of his policy was revealed the next year, and turned out to be exactly the same as that pursued earlier by Majorian. Having obtained the support or acquiescence of the major power blocs in Italy and southern Gaul, Anthemius, like Majorian, turned on the Vandals. In 468, a very large expe- dition was put together, comprising both forces from the western empire and a vast eastern fleet commanded by Basiliscus. On its approach to North Africa, however, Vandal fire ships destroyed the bulk of the fleet, and with it sank any hope of Roman victory (Procop. Wars 3.6.10—26).
61 Cass. Chron. s.a. 465; cf. Sid. Ap. Carm. 11.317-18.
2 Anthemius himself: PLRE 11.96-8. Marcellinus accompanied him to Italy in 467 and was named Patrician in 468 (PLRE 11.709—10). Ricimer: O'Flynn (1983) 115 ff. On Anthemius in Gaul, Stein (1959) 389-90; O'Flynn (1983) 118.
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THE FALL OF THE WESTERN EMPIRE 25
The policy of attacking the Vandals makes very considerable sense. There were only two possible ways of breaking the vicious circle affecting the western empire after the collapse of Hunnic power, whereby too many political participants were bankrupting the entity to which they were looking for rewards. Either the number of political participants had to be reduced, or central financial resources increased. This clarifies the logic, it seems to me, behind attacking the Vandals, the policy pursued by both Majorian and Anthemius. Victory over the Vandals would have renewed imperial prestige, but, more important, it would have removed from the political game one of its major players. Perhaps above all, it would have restored to the rump western empire the richest of its original territories. Both Vandal expeditions failed (and as a result both regimes fell apart), but what if either had succeeded? Particularly in 468, the expedition was a very serious effort,“ and the later success of Belisarius shows that recon- quering North Africa was not inherently impossible.
Buoyed up by victory and the promise of African revenues, a victorious western emperor could certainly have re-established his political hold on the landowners of southern Gaul and Spain. Many of them would have instinctively supported an imperial revival. Sidonius, and the other Gallic aristocrats who would later organize resistance to Euric the Goth, for instance (see below), would have been only too happy to reassert their ties to the centre. Burgundians, Goths and Sueves would have had to be faced in due course, but victory would have considerably extended the active life of the western empire.
3. Lhe end of empire, 468-76
As events turned out, the expeditions failed, and with them disappeared any possibility of escaping the cycle of decline. As the Franks in particular grew in importance, the number of players increased rather than diminished. Since the empire’s financial base was simultaneously decreasing, the idea of empire quickly became meaningless. The centre no longer controlled any- thing anyone wanted. In consequence, the late 460s and 470s saw one group after another coming to the realization that the western empire was no longer a prize worth fighting for. It must have been an extraordinary moment as the realization dawned on the leaders of individual interest groups, and upon members of local Roman landowning élites, that, after hundreds of years of existence, the Roman state in western Europe was now an anachronism.
63 Majorian was deposed by Ricimer after his defeat (p. 23 above); Anthemius’ defeat allowed Ricimer to assassinate his main supporter, Matcellinus: O’Flynn (1983) 117.
6 Refs. as PLRE 11.213; cf. Courtois (1955) 199ff.
6 Sidonius: pp. 29-30 below. So, too, men in Spain such as Hydatius who had previously looked to the centre for help: see pp. 9, 13 above.
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26 I. THE WESTERN EMPIRE, 425-76
The first to grasp the point was Euric, king of the Visigoths. After the Vandals defeated Anthemius, he immediately launched a series of wats which, by 475, had brought under his control much of Gaul and Spain (see ch. 5 (Collins), pp. 121-2 below). There is a striking description of his deci- sion to launch these campaigns in the Gefica of Jordanes:
Becoming aware of the frequent changes of [western] Roman emperor, Euric, king of the Visigoths, pressed forward to seize Gaul on his own authority.
This snippet captures rather well what it must have been like suddenly to realize that the time had come to pursue one’s own aims with total indepen- dence.® Euric’s lead was soon followed by the other interested parties. The eastern empire, for instance, abandoned any hope in the west when it made peace with the Vandals, probably in 474.°’ As we have seen, Constantinople had previously viewed the conquest of North Africa as a means of reinvig- orating the western empire, giving its support both to Majorian’s and espe- cially to Anthemius’ efforts in this direction. Making peace with the Vandals was thus a move of huge significance, signalling the end of substantial attempts to sustain the west. Diplomatic recognition as western emperor was subsequently granted to Julius Nepos, but he never received any prac- tical military assistance.”
That the western empire had ceased to mean anything dawned on the Burgundians at more or less the same time. Gundobad, one of the heirs to the throne, played a major role in central politics in the early 470s. A close ally of Ricimer, he helped him defeat Anthemius. Relations between Ricimer and Anthemius had turned sour soon after the collapse of the Vandal expedition. A first quarrel, in 470, was healed by negotiation in 471, but in 472 relations deteriorated to the point of war, and it was Gundobad who captured and killed Anthemius on 11 July. Gundobad also supported the subsequent regime of Olybrius, whom Ricimer proclaimed emperor in April 472, and even took over the role of kingmaker after Ricimer’s death. Ricimer died on 18 August 472, closely followed to the grave by the last of his imperial nominees, Olybrius, on 2 November. Gundobad subsequently persuaded Glycerius to accept the western throne, to which he was elevated on 3 March 473.° Sometime in late 473 or early 474, however, Gundobad ‘suddenly’ (as one chronicler put it) left Rome.” Possibly this was due to his father’s death, or perhaps he just gave up the struggle. Either way, he
6 Jord. Get. 45.237; cf. Wolfram (1988) 181ff.
67 Malchus, ed. Blockley fr. 5, dating between February 474 and Zeno’s exile in January 475, there- fore most likely mid 474; cf. Courtois (1955) 204. The treaty is misdated to ‘probably 476’ at PLRE 11.499.
68 Leo supported Nepos in 473/4 before the latter seized the western throne: John of Antioch fr. 209. But cf. Malchus, ed. Blockley fr. 14: Nepos got no practical help between his retreat from Italy in 475 and his death in 480. ® Refs. as PLRE 11.524; cf. Stein (1959) 395; O’Flynn (1983) 121ff.
7° Malalas, ed. Bonn, 374~5; otherwise PLRE 11.524.
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THE FALL OF THE WESTERN EMPIRE 27
never bothered to return. Events at home were now much more important to Gundobad than those at the centre.
The army of Dalmatia made one more attempt to sponsor a regime, when Julius Nepos marched into Italy in 474. Glycerius was deposed without a struggle and ordained bishop of Salona. One year later, however, Nepos left again — definitively — in the face of the hostility of Orestes and the army of Italy.”' Fittingly, it was the army of Italy which was the last to give up. In 475, its commander Orestes proclaimed his own son Romulus emperor, but within a year lost control of his soldiers. Not surprisingly, given all the resources which had by now been seized by others, it was shortage of money which caused the unrest. A subordinate commander, Odoacer, organized a putsch, murdered Orestes, and deposed Romulus, derisively titled Augustulus, on or around 4 September 476.” He then sent an embassy to Constantinople which did no more than state the obvious. There was no longer any need for an emperor in the west.”
4. Romans and barbarians
Alongside, and often as part of, the great power blocs, many millions of individuals found themselves caught up in the events which brought about the end of the Roman empire in western Europe. Of these, the surviving sources allow us to say most about the experiences and reactions of local landowning élites. As much as the imperial court at Ravenna, the provin- cial landowning élites of the west were the Roman empire, in that it was tun by them and for them. Their adherence to it, or lack of it, is thus as good a measure of the prevalence of empire as are the activities of the court. The variety of reactions to fifth-century events among even this élite is very striking, and, thanks to the correspondence of Sidonius Apollinaris, particularly well documented in the case of Gallo-Roman landowners. Some local landowning groups throughout the west (outside, perhaps, Italy) responded quickly to temporary or permanent power vacuums created by the intrusion of armed immigrants into the western empire. In Britain, independence was asserted as early as 410, although, as the Saxon threat grew, some seem to have regretted the decision and wrote to Aetius (probably in 446) requesting his assistance (Gildas 20). Likewise, in north- ern, and particularly north-western, Gaul, many of the groups labelled bagaudae should probably be understood as representing a similar kind of phenomenon, rather than, as has sometimes been argued, outright peasant
| Refs. as PLRE 11.777.
” Refs. as PLRE 11.811-12. Cf. Procop. Wars v.1.5—8; the troops demanded ‘one-third of the lands of Italy’; what this means is debated: p. 22 above, n. 53.
3 Malchus, ed. Blockley fr. 14; despite the opening sentence, the rest makes clear Odoacer’s respon- sibility for the initiative.
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28 I. THE WESTERN EMPIRE, 425-76
revolt. In Armorica, the disturbances aimed at independence or some degree of autonomy. In Spain, at least some of the groups operating in Tarraconensis in the 440s were advocating accommodation with the Sueves as opposed to continued allegiance to the empire (see p. 13 above).
Not dissimilar processes had begun to unfold even in southern Gaul in the 410s. In the early years of the decade, some members of the Gallo- Roman élite rallied to usurpers sponsored by the Goths and Burgundians. Such alliances of immigrants and Roman landowners represented as great a danger to the unity of the empire as declarations of independence. For local power-brokers to see political entities other than the imperial court as the main force in their lives presaged imperial collapse. Moreover, after the Gothic settlement in Aquitaine in 418, economic reasons dictated that any Gallo-Roman with estates in the Garonne had to enter into relations with the Goths or leave. Much of Paulinus of Pella’s patrimony, for instance, inherited from Ausonius, was situated in areas around Bordeaux that were now dominated by the Goths. This was perhaps the primary reason why his sons migrated to the Visigothic court.” The sources provide us with no evi- dence between ¢. 415 and 450, however, of further close political alliances between Roman and Goth. In this I suspect that the re-establishment and continued operation of the Gallic council probably played a part. The council was re-established in 418, the year of the Gothic settlement in Aquitaine. This is unlikely to have been mere chronological coincidence. Giving Gallic landowners a designated forum established firm lines of com- munication between these men and Ravenna.” Aetius’ campaigns and the council can be seen as two reflections of one policy which contained within very strict limits the ability of Goths and other immigrants to exercise influence within the empire.
After 450, circumstances changed dramatically. Sidonius’ writings illus- trate the ways in which an ever wider cross-section of the political classes of southern Gaul were drawn particularly into a Gothic orbit, as Goths participated ever more centrally in imperial politics. From the early 460s, we find Romans holding military offices to which they were appointed by Gothic kings. The first was probably Arborius,’° and others quickly fol- lowed. Vincentius was perhaps an imperial general in 465, but by 477 he was Euric’s dux Hispaniae. Others were Victorius, Calminius and Namatius.”’ At the same time, similarly, disaffected Roman officials entered into negotia- tions with the Gothic king. In 468, the newly reappointed prefect of Gaul, Arvandus, wrote to Euric telling him to throw off the rule of Anthemius — the ‘Greekling’ who had just taken the throne — and divide up the provinces
™ Exch. 4ggft.; cf. 570ff., 514f.5 Salvian, De Gub. Dei v.5 ff.
On the council, see Matthews (1975) 333f; Heather (1992).
76 Hydat. Chron. 213 .a. 461; cf. Harries (1995) 97.
77 On these men, see respectively: PLRE 11.1168; PLRE 11.1162—4; Sid. Ap. Epp. 5.12; 8.6.
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THE FALL OF THE WESTERN EMPIRE 29
of Gaul with the Burgundians (Sid. Ap. &p. 1.7.5). Shortly afterwards, another high civilian imperial official, Seronatus, possibly vicarius to the Gallic prefect, visited Euric on several occasions and encouraged him in the same direction. Seronatus was brought to trial and executed before 475 (PLRE 11.995f.). By the mid 470s, Romans were holding high civilian appointments under Gothic kings. The first known example is Leo of Narbonne, who became Euric’s chief civilian adviser (PLRE 11.662f.).
As Gothic influence increased, more Romans took up service among the Goths, prompted by a wide variety of motives. Some probably did think that accommodation with the Goths and others was the best way to main- tain order in a changing political climate (cf. Paulinus of Pella, Ewch. 290ff.). Others were probably more personally ambitious. Sidonius is perhaps being ironic in commenting, in a letter to Namatius, on how sensible it is of him to follow ‘the standards of a victorious people’ (4p. 8.6.16). In addi- tion, recent studies have stressed how competitive were the lives of Gallo- Roman aristocrats. They were constantly in dispute with one another for prestige and financial gain.” In circumstances where Gothic power was increasing, it became only natural to look to the Goths for assistance in both climbing to the top and staying there.
This whole process of accommodation between immigrants and Roman élites was, however, far from smooth. In the fifth century, as we have seen, western imperial authorities conducted a whole series of major campaigns and fought countless minor engagements to maintain their control. Local assertions of independence and the so-called bagaudic movements also involved violence and disruption on a very considerable scale. Even rela- tively peaceful transfers of loyalty among the landowners of southern Gaul could be traumatic. A good case in point is that of Arvandus, the Gallic prefect toppled for plotting with the Goths. He was taken before the senate in Rome, where his accusers were fellow Gallic aristocrats. All were related to, or associates of, Sidonius, whose letter describing the trial is strongly critical of Arvandus. Yet, despite being sentenced to death, Arvandus was eventually spared, partly because Sidonius and his friends appealed for his life (Sid. Ap. Ep. 1.7.4ff.). The rise of Gothic power thus split opinion in southern Gaul. Nor is Arvandus an isolated example. Calminius, corre- spondent of Sidonius, fought for the Goths at Clermont, at the same time as Sidonius was busy conducting its defence (Sid. Ap. Ep. 5.12).
While some were willing to work with Gothic kings, therefore, others were not, especially when the Goths threw off their allegiance to the empire. Sidonius himself is representative of this strand of opinion. He was happy to work with, and even praise, the Goths when they were a plank of Avitus’ regime (see p. 20 above). He was also willing to accept Gothic
78 Van Dam, Leadership and Community 57£f.; Brown (1982); Harries (1995) ch. 1.
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30 I. THE WESTERN EMPIRE, 425-76
territorial extensions, such as the ceding of Narbonne, if they were legiti- mized by the empire. But when the Goths took over southern Gaul without authorization, he resisted, his chief collaborators being Ecdicius, son of Avitus, and Eucherius.”” For these men, and others like them, the Goths may have been acceptable allies in the creation of imperial regimes. They were entirely unacceptable, however, as a complete alternative to the con- tinued existence of the western empire.
In the course of the fifth century, then, we witness a process of psycho- logical adjustment, among local Roman landowning élites, to the fact of imperial disintegration. That different local situations prompted different local strategies for survival and self-advancement is hardly surprising. We can perhaps venture to say more. Local landowners represent that class of men who had prospered (to different degrees) under the established polit- ical order: the Roman empire. As a group, they had potentially the most to lose from the political revolution represented by its collapse. Some, however, had mote to lose than others. A fair rule of thumb would seem to be that those who had gained most from the old order clung to it the longest. This would explain why élites in peripheral areas, who did not par- ticipate as fully in the benefits of empire, were quicker to cast in their lot with barbarians or to declare independence. For them, presumably, the benefits of empire (assessed in terms of personal rewards and collective defence) did not outweigh its costs (above all, taxation). For others such as Sidonius, however, relatives of emperors, or would-be emperors, and holders of high imperial office, life without the empire was a much more intimidating proposition. But in the end, continued tenure of their landed possessions would demand that even this group mend its fences, in so far as it could, with the new powers in the land. It was either that or lose every- thing. Thus Sidonius eventually wrote verses in praise of the glories of his erstwhile enemy, Euric (Sid. Ap. Ep. 8.9.5). He did it, however, to effect his own release from exile, and another letter makes clear his hatred of old Gothic women ‘quarrelling, drinking and vomiting’ outside his window
(Sid. Ap. Ep. 8.3.2).
III. CONCLUSION
Seventy years separated the deposition of Romulus Augustulus in 476 from the invasions and population movements of the first decade of the fifth century (themselves prompted by the intrusion of the Huns into central Europe). None the less, the two are intimately linked. The regular political crises for the empire in intervening years represent no more than the slow working out of the full political consequences of the earlier invasions. The
” PLRE 11.384; cf. Sid. Ap. Ep. 3.8, Harries (1995) 185-7.
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CONCLUSION 31
loss of territory to the invaders — sometimes sanctioned by treaty, some- times not — meant a loss of revenue and a consequent loss of power. As the state lost power, and was perceived to have done so, local Roman land- owning élites came to the realization that their interests would best be served by making political accommodations with the outsiders or, in a minority of cases, by taking independent responsibility for their own defence. Given that the empire had existed for four hundred years, and that the east continued to prop up the west, it is perhaps not surprising that these processes took between two and three generations to work them- selves out in the old empire’s heartlands: southern Gaul, Italy and Spain (even if élites in other areas, such as Britain, were quicker off the mark). Despite the time-lag, the well-documented nature of these processes sub- stantiates a direct link between the invasions and the collapse of empire. There was no separate additional crisis.
The nature of this crisis has been much debated and, in some ways, does not now appear so cataclysmic as it did to older generations of historians.*° The appearance of barbarian powers actually within the western empire’s borders in the fifth century, for instance, can legitimately be seen as having opened up a pre-existing fault line in the relationship between imperial centre and local Roman landowning élites. The centre relied on a mixture of constraint and reward to focus the loyalties of landowners, some of them many hundreds of miles distant, upon the empire: never an easy bal- ancing act.*' Moreover, at least in some areas — particularly southern Gaul, Italy and Spain — there was a considerable degree of survival among Roman landowning élites, many choosing to cast in their lot with the new powers in the land, and so survive as élite landowners into the post-Roman politi- cal era. In recent years, likewise, the peaceful nature particularly of the final stage of the process — when Roman élites actually jumped from Roman imperial to barbarian royal courts — has received considerable and due attention. And it has also been pointed out — again correctly — that many of the intruders (Goths, Burgundians, Franks, etc.) were not unknown out- siders, but peoples who had been established on the frontier for many years. Indeed, the Roman state had previously enjoyed, with all or most of them, a whole range of close diplomatic, economic and social contacts.”
None of this means, however, that the fall of the Roman empire was anything other than a revolution. In political terms, a unitary state in western Europe fragmented into a whole series of mutually antagonistic successors. As we have seen, the process of fragmentation was protracted and violent. Likewise, the immigrant groups, even if tied to the empire, had
5° Just in English, for instance, one might compare Bury (1928) with Brown (1971).
51 One case study is Heather (1994).
82 See, for instance, the works of Walter Goffart cited in the Bibliography, and, for a broader per- spective over time, Whittaker (1994).
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32 I. THE WESTERN EMPIRE, 425-76
previously been its subordinate satellites. Now they became its masters. And Roman landowning élites had, in the end, no choice but to make their accommodations with the immigrants, or lose the very lands on which their élite status was based. The end of the empire was thus not the result of free choice. In making their way to the courts of barbarian kings, Roman élites (at least in the inner core of empire) were merely struggling to ensure that political revolution should not be accompanied by social and economic cataclysm.
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CHAPTER 2
THE EASTERN EMPIRE: THEODOSIUS TO ANASTASIUS
A. D. LEE
When he assumed sole rulership of the eastern half of the Roman empire in 408, Theodosius II became head of a state which during the short reign of his father Arcadius (395—408) had experienced an extraordinary array of crises. Gothic troops in Roman employ had risen in revolt under the lead- ership of Alaric in 395 and spent much time during the following years freely plundering the Balkan provinces until Alaric eventually decided to move westwards (401).' Also in 395, nomadic Huns had invaded the empire through the Caucasus, bringing widespread destruction to Syria and eastern Asia Minor until 397.7 Another Goth named Gainas, who held a command in the Roman army, instigated a revolt which was only suppressed in 400 with much bloodshed in and around Constantinople.’ Within a few years there was further turmoil in the capital over the bitterly contested deposi- tion and exile of the bishop John Chrysostom (403—4),* while eastern Asia Minor suffered a prolonged bout of raiding by Isaurian brigands (403—6).° In addition to all this, relations with the western half of the empire throughout Arcadius’ reign were characterized by antagonism and mutual suspicion, the result of the ambitions and rivalries of dominant individu- als, such as Eutropius and Stilicho, at the courts of Arcadius in Constantinople and his younger brother Honorius in the west.°
Against this background, one might justifiably have wondered about the prospects for the eastern half of the empire — even more so when one adds into the equation the fact that Theodosius was a mere seven years old in 408. Contrary to expectation, however, Theodosius’ reign was a long one (408-50),’ and although he and his successors down to the early sixth century were to experience numerous crises of a gravity comparable to those of Arcadius’ reign, the eastern empire proved able to survive this crit- ical period, during which its western counterpart succumbed. Why this
Liebeschuetz, Barbarians and Bishops ch. 5; Heather, Goths and Romans ch. 6.
Maenchen-Helfen (1973) 51-9.
Liebeschuetz, Barbarians and Bishops chs. 9-11; Cameron and Long (1993) chs. 5—6, 8. Liebeschuetz, Barbarians and Bishops chs. 15-21; Kelly (1995) chs. 16-18. > Shaw (1990) 249. Cameron, Alan (1970); Matthews (1975) ch. 10; Liebeschuetz, Barbarians and Bishops chs. 6, 8. Arcadius had elevated him to the status of co-emperor in January 402 while still a baby, so the formal length of his reign was actually forty-eight years — the longest of any Roman emperor.
1 2 3 4 6 7
33
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34 2. THE EASTERN EMPIRE: THEODOSIUS TO ANASTASIUS
should have happened is not easy to account for, particularly because it is generally more difficult to explain why something did ot happen. Nevertheless, it remains a question of fundamental importance, to which this chapter will endeavour to suggest some answers.
I. THEODOSIUS II
1. Political life
There was obviously no question of the seven-year-old Theodosius having any real involvement in government affairs for some years, so it should occasion no surprise that during his minority power lay in the hands of various officials at court, notably the praetorian prefect Anthemius.* Even once he reached adulthood, however, Theodosius appears rarely to have attempted to exercise power in his own right, showing greater interest in theological and scholarly pursuits. One consequence of this was that his court gained a reputation for patronage of literary and educational endea- vouts,’ reflected, among other things, in reforms of university teaching in the capital (425)!° and the production of the Theodosian Code (429-37).!!
Another consequence, however, was that the initiative in political life by and large lay with individuals other than the emperor himself, making it difficult to determine the extent to which Theodosius deserves credit or blame for particular decisions or policies. Female members of the imperial family feature prominently in this respect, notably Theodosius’ sister Pulcheria and his wife Eudocia, whom he married in 421, although the extent of their power has probably been exaggerated.’? Helion’s long tenure of the important office of magister offciorum (414-27) marks him out as a man with influence, while the praetorian prefect Cyrus was important during the 430s, until displaced by Theodosius’ chamberlain, the eunuch Chrysaphius, who was pre-eminent throughout the 440s.'? Although less conspicuous, certain military figures are also worthy of note: the way in which the Alan general Flavius Ardabur and members of his family, espe- cially his son Aspar, held high commands throughout much of Theodosius’ reign must be significant,'* while during the emperor’s final years, the Isaurian general Flavius Zeno (not to be confused with the later
5 On the early years of Theodosius’ reign, see Lippold (1973) 964-6, CAH? xin, ch. 4 (Blockley).
° Momigliano (1972) 12-17. '0 Cameron, Alan (1982) 285-7.
1 Harries and Wood (1993) 1-6.
12 See Holum (1977) and Holum, Empresses for this emphasis, Liebeschuetz, Barbarians and Bishops 134 and Harries (1994) 35—6 for reservations.
13 See PLRE 11, s.v, Helion 1, Cyrus 7, Chrysaphius, with emendations on points of detail (especially on Cyrus) in Cameron, Alan (1982).
14 Family solidarity is epitomized in the silver missorium celebrating Aspat’s consulship in 434: CZL x1.2637 (= LS 1299) with Painter (1991). For details of careers, see PLRE u, s.v. Fl. Ardabur 3, FI.
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THEODOSIUS II 35
emperor) emerged as a powerful enemy of Chrysaphius and someone whom Theodosius is said to have feared as a potential usurper.'>
The important role of these individuals in the political life of Theodosius’ reign can be explained partly in personal terms, as a result of Theodosius’ own apparent lack of inclination to exercise power (a ten- dency no doubt encouraged by his advisers and tutors during his formative years). But it also reflects an important structural change in the character of the imperial office which began during the reign of his father — namely, the way in which first Arcadius and then Theodosius abandoned leading the army on campaign in person and indeed rarely travelled far beyond the environs of Constantinople, instead spending virtually the whole of their reigns in the capital.'° The permanent residence of emperors in Constantinople enhanced the opportunities for those at court to exercise influence because the emperor was now constantly in contact with them and was also less exposed to the outside views and influences that would have been one of the incidental benefits of a more itinerant lifestyle.'’ To be sure, the adherence of subsequent emperors of the fifth and sixth century to this pattern did not prevent them from taking more active roles in political life, but they had experienced substantial portions of their lives beyond the confines of the palace before they assumed the imperial purple. Theodosius, on the other hand, had known nothing else and was therefore that much more susceptible to the limiting effects of this regime.
Despite all this, however, Theodosius was not overthrown, nor did the imperial office come to be seen as something which could be dispensed with.'* For one thing, Theodosius’ formal claim to the throne, unlike that of most of his fifth-century successors, was not open to question: he was the son of the deceased emperor, and had already been elevated to the status of co-emperor with his father some years earlier.!? For another, the very prominence of influential courtiers and advisers is likely to have had
Ardabur Aspar (though he was probably not magister in the final years of the 440s: Zuckerman (1994) 170-2), Fl. Plinta (though he was probably still magisterin 439/40: Zuckerman (1994) 160-3).
1S PLRE u, sv. Fl. Zeno 6.
'6 Presumably it was anxieties about this development, coming as it did after more than a century of military emperors, which spawned the story that Theodosius I had forbidden his sons to campaign: Joh. Lyd. De Mag. 11.11, 111.41. For Theodosius’ known movements outside Constantinople, see Dagron, Naissance 85—6, with Roueché (1986).
" Hopkins (1978) ch. 4, valuable though it is on the power of eunuchs, does not take sufficient account of this fundamental change in imperial behaviour in the fifth century. On eunuchs, see also Patterson (1982) 299-333.
'8 Reports of potential usurpers (Priscus fr. 16) show that Theodosius’ position was sometimes per- ceived to be under threat. Cf. the popular anger expressed against Theodosius himself during a grain shortage in the capital (Marcell. Chron. s.a. 431).
'° This is not to deny that the months immediately following Arcadius’ death were nervous ones in Constantinople, since Theodosius was still vulnerable on account of his extreme youth: see Zos. v.31.3—-4, Soz. HE 1x.4 (Stilicho’s plans), Lippold (1973) 963-4, Blockley (1992) 51-2 (for the proble- matic sources on possible Persian interference); threats from these quartets, however, soon dissipated.
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the effect of deflecting criticism from the emperor.”° Similarly, although his non-involvement in military campaigning curtailed his contact with the army and risked leaving him more vulnerable to military usurpation, it also had the important benefit of shielding him from the political (and possible physical) consequences of military defeat, and so played its part in his sur- vival and that of his office.”!
At the same time Theodosius was quick to capitalize on anything which could be presented as a success on the part of his armies. The Persian war of 421-2, which may in part have been embraced anyway for its potential political benefits for the unmilitary Theodosius,” quickly became the subject of a flurry of celebratory poetry even though the war itself ended in stalemate, while news of the success of eastern troops against the western usurpet John in 425 was the occasion for the emperor to lead an impromptu procession of thanksgiving through the capital.?? Theodosius’ participation in hunting is surely also significant in this context: in earlier centuries, hunting, as the sport most closely allied to warfare, had been a way for unwarlike emperors to offset any stigma arising from their lack of involvement in military affairs.”*
But though victory had always been an important element in the projec- tion of a strong image by emperors, it was, fortunately, not the only impe- tial virtue available for exploitation.”» Philanthropia was another which Theodosius could be seen exercising,” while his renowned reluctance to impose capital punishment secured his claim to clementia.”’ But it was pietas, an attribute with a respectable pedigree going back to Augustus,” and given fresh significance more recently by Christianity, which through the influence of the devout Pulcheria and in the hands of contemporary writers became the keynote of the Theodosian court. There is no reason to doubt Theodosius’ personal sincerity in this area, but in a society where asceticism was accorded great respect there were also clear political advan- tages to be gained from advertising this aspect of the emperor’s behaviour — his regular fasting, self-denial of comforts, daily devotions and memor- izing of the scriptures — and the stories which circulated concerning the role of the emperor’s prayers in achieving military success served to confirm that such piety was an attribute of real consequence.” It was to
20 Cf. Hopkins (1978) 196. 21 Cf. Whitby (1992).
22 Liebeschuetz, Barbarians and Bishops 129.
3 Soc. HE vii.21.7—-10, 23.11-12; John Ant. fr. 195 (= FHG 1.613). Cf. Chron. Pasch. p. 579 which reports the formal announcement in the capital of a Roman success during the Persian war of 421-2.
4 Theodosius’ hunting: John Ant. fr. 194 (= FHG 1v.612); Theodore Lector, HE 353 (Hansen p. 100.4); earlier centuries: Charlesworth (1943) 4.
5 Charlesworth (1937), with Wallace-Hadrill (1981).
26 Notably in subventions towards the costs of public building projects in provincial cities: Nou. Tb. 23 (443) (Heraclea Salbake, Caria: see Roueché (1986)); cf. Marcell. Chron. s.a. 436 (Cyzicus).
27 Soc. HE vut.22.9-11. 8 Charlesworth (1943). 2) Soc. HE vi1.22.4-7, 23.9; Harries (1994).
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play a role of continuing and increasing importance in preserving the integ- rity of the imperial office through the vicissitudes of the fifth century and beyond.
2. Religious affairs
“Give me the earth undefiled by heretics, and in return I will give you heaven. Help me to destroy the heretics, and I will help you to destroy the Persians.’ This blunt appeal, reportedly made to Theodosius by a bishop of Constantinople, provides a telling insight into how it was believed the emperor could enhance his piety — and the practical benefits that would ensue.’ Certainly, Theodosius’ reign witnessed the proclamation of a number of measures aimed at penalizing heretics, as well as pagans and adherents of other religious groups in the eastern empire.*' The confident rhetoric of these laws, however, often belied their effectiveness. Despite Theodosius’ assumption to the contrary in 423, pagan practices continued, as the very repetition of the laws, together with other evidence, shows.” Indeed, it cannot in practice have been a straightforward task to enforce such laws consistently anyway, and a significant element of pragmatism is also apparent in their application. Known pagans and Arians continued to hold high military rank throughout Theodosius’ reign,*’ and the significant numbers of Arian Goths serving in the army must have acted as a power- ful disincentive against strict implementation of the relevant laws, let alone the introduction of more severe ones.** But perhaps for a regime con- cerned to promote the idea of imperial piety, it was the pronouncement of the laws, rather than their enforcement, which was ultimately of primary importance. At the same time, it is worth remembering that, even if the extent of official enforcement was variable, some clergy had no hesitation about taking matters into their own hands.*°
Another important dimension of imperial piety, first articulated by Constantine, was concern for harmony within the church, and Theodosius’ reign was not short of opportunities for its exercise. The latent potential for conflict between the theological traditions of Antioch and Alexandria over the seemingly rarefied issue of the relationship between the human and the divine in Christ was realized when the renowned Antiochene preacher, Nestorius, was chosen by Theodosius to be bishop of Constantinople (428) and proceeded to use his position to insist that the appropriate epithet for
© Soc. HE vit.29.5 (the bishop in question was Nestorius).
31 Heretics: C.Tb. xv1.6.65 (428), Now Th. 8.9 (438); pagans: C:Tb. xvi.10.21 (415), 22 (423), 25 (435), Now.Th. 3.8 (438); Jews and Samaritans: C: 7h. xv1.8.25 (423), 27 (23), NouTh. 3.2-5 (438), with discus- sion in Linder (1987) (see also Millar (1992) 117-21). 32 Harl (1990); Trombley, Hellenic Religion.
3° PLRE u1, s.v, Apollonius 3, Fl. Zeno 6 (pagans); Fl. Plinta, Fl. Ardabur Aspar, Ardabur 1 (Arians).
34 Liebeschuetz, Barbarians and Bishops 148. % Eg. Soc. HE v1.29, 31; Gregory (1979) 143.
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38 2. THE EASTERN EMPIRE: THEODOSIUS TO ANASTASIUS
the Virgin Mary was Christotokos (Mother of Christ’) rather than the tradi- tional title of 7heotokos (Mother of God’) with its implicit emphasis on Christ’s divinity. In an attempt to resolve the ensuing controversy which this aroused with Cyril, patriarch of Alexandria (412-44), Theodosius inter- vened and called a council at Ephesus (431), in the expectation that it would uphold Nestorius, for whose abilities Theodosius had great respect. In fact, the council took the view that his teaching effectively proposed the existence of a human Christ and a separate divine Christ, and condemned Nestorius. Despite the council’s serious procedural irregularities, Theodosius executed a volte-face and approved the verdict.
The controversy did not, however, go away. In the late 440s a prominent Constantinopolitan monk, Eutyches, who had been teaching his version of Cyril’s views in the capital, was condemned for denying Christ’s humanity by a local council convened by the bishop, Flavian (448). Cyril’s successor at Alexandria, Dioscorus (444-51), was outraged and induced Theodosius to convene a second council at Ephesus (449), at which the condemnation of Eutyches was reversed and Flavian and other supposed Nestorian sym- pathizers were condemned. The proceedings were, however, accompanied by intimidation and violence on the part of Dioscorus’ supporters, prompting pope Leo to denounce the whole occasion as ‘brigandage’ and demand a fresh gathering under his own presidency. Theodosius, however, was not at all enthusiastic about this proposal.*°
Although these disagreements were in the first instance doctrinal in char- acter, the vehemence of the feelings and behaviour they aroused betrays the existence of important non-theological dimensions as well. For example, it was difficult for Antioch, Alexandria and Constantinople to disentangle the debate about orthodoxy from questions of ecclesiastical rivalry and pres- tige,°’ and the support of some western Anatolian bishops for Cyril’s con- demnation of Nestorius was motivated by resentment at encroachments on their independence by the patriarchate of Constantinople.** Imperial actions were likewise swayed by political considerations. Theodosius ini- tially resisted the idea of calling a council in 430 until public disturbances in Constantinople persuaded him otherwise; his reluctant abandonment of Nestorius in 431 seems to have been induced by his realization of the extent of popular opposition to the bishop; and his behaviour in the late 440s reflected the loyalty of Chrysaphius, then the key figure at court, to Eutyches, who happened to be his godfather.” This goes a long way towards explaining Theodosius’ cool response to Leo’s demand for a fresh
36 For a succinct but magisterial exposition of the theological issues and historical context of the events outlined in this and the preceding paragraph, see Chadwick (1983). For more detailed discus- sions, see Gregory (1979) chs. 4-5; Young (1983) 229-89; Frend, Monopbhysite Movement ch. 1 (to be read with Wickham (1973)). 37 Baynes (1955). °% Gregory (1979) 102.
2, Gregory (1979) 100-1, 108-14, 134-41.
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council, a response which looked set to create an impasse until Theodosius’ unexpected death the following year reopened the possibility of new devel- opments.
3. Foreign relations
For much of the fourth century, relations with Sasanian Persia had been the most taxing external problem confronting the eastern half of the Roman empire. In the final decades of that century, however, the focus of attention had shifted elsewhere, and this pattern continued during Theodosius’ reign. The empire did fight two wars against Persia in the first half of the fifth century, but these conflicts — the first in 421-2, the second in 440°? — were of short duration and constituted brief interruptions to otherwise quiescent relations between the two powers, both of whom had other, more pressing preoccupations. In the case of Persia, this took the form primarily of nomads from Central Asia troubling its north-eastern frontier." In the case of Constantinople, there were two pre-eminent areas of concern — developments in the western Mediterranean, and relations with the Huns in the lower Danube basin.
Eastern forces were despatched westwards on four occasions during Theodosius’ reign. In 410, 4,000 men were sent to Ravenna to assist in the defence of the western emperor Honorius against Alaric and the Goths, while in 424 an army commanded by Ardabur and Aspar intervened in the upheaval that followed Honorius’ death, eventually defeating the usurper John and overseeing the installation on the western throne of Honorius’ nephew, Valeninian HI (425). The third occasion was in 431, when eastern units under Aspar went to North Africa to aid western forces struggling to hold back the eastward advance of the Vandals towards Carthage. Although Aspat’s forces enjoyed limited success in the ensuing campaign, this involvement none the less contributed to achieving the settlement of 435 which preserved, albeit only temporarily, Roman control of the more valuable eastern provinces of the region. Finally, when the Vandals subse- quently broke the treaty and captured Carthage itself (439), another expe- dition — probably the largest of the four — was organized to act in concert with western forces (441).
Constantinople’s willingness to commit substantial forces to the western Mediterranean in this way may initially appear somewhat surprising. On the first three occasions, eastern interests were not threatened in any obvious or direct manner, so that intervention is best understood as an expression of dynastic solidarity with members of the Theodosian family, mingled
# Blockley (1992) 56-61. 4. Frye (1984) 320-1. ” For further detail on these events, see ch. 1 (Heather), pp. 9-12 above.
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4o 2. THE EASTERN EMPIRE: THEODOSIUS TO ANASTASIUS
with an element of self-interest.? However, the Vandal capture of Carthage with its docks and shipping introduced a dramatic new element into the equation. The western empire promptly undertook hurried defen- sive measures in anticipation of sea-borne attacks on Italy,** and an impe- rial order to extend the mural defences of Constantinople along the seaward sides of the city has often been interpreted in the same light.” The Vandal invasion of Sicily in 440 showed that there was genuine cause for apprehension, and concern about its potential ramifications for the secur- ity of the eastern Mediterranean must have influenced Constantinople’s decision to commit substantial forces to the expedition of 441.
In the event, the expedition never progressed beyond Sicily because a Hun offensive in the Balkans forced Constantinople to recall its troops. Not for the first time during Theodosius’ reign, Hunnic moves dictated eastern policy. The Huns had of course impinged on Roman horizons well before Theodosius’ accession, having first made their presence felt indi- rectly as far back as the 370s, when their movements across the steppe regions north of the Caspian and Black Seas induced Gothic tribes adja- cent to the lower Danube to seek admission to the empire. However, it was probably not until the early years of Theodosius’ reign that the Huns them- selves reached the Danube in significant numbers,*® or were in a position to pose a serious threat to the heartlands of the eastern empire. Throughout history, the general socio-economic character of nomadic pastoralist peoples such as the Huns has never been conducive to the emer- gence of centralized political power — dispersal in small groups over large areas, absence of permanent settlements, and minimal social differentiation have tended to militate against any such development. However, where they are able to establish dominance over a sedentary population and exploit their produce and manpower, such a development can occur.*” By the early fifth century, the Huns had achieved hegemony over various settled peoples living north of the Danube — Goths, Gepids, Heruls and others — and Constaninople found itself having to deal with rulers such as Rua and Attila who could command significant human and material resources.
The consequences were felt for the first time in 422 when Rua took advantage of imperial preoccupation with war against Persia to launch an invasion of Thrace, and the empire had to buy him off by agreeing to an annual payment of 350 pounds of gold.** Rua employed a similar strategy in 434, making further demands when significant numbers of eastern troops were absent defending Carthage against the Vandals. Negotiations
43 Kaegi (1968) ch. 1; Matthews (1975) 378-82. “4 Now Val. 5 (March 440), 9 (June 440). Chron. Pasch. p. 583 with Whitby and Whitby (1989) 72 n. 243. 46 Heather (1995) 5—19. 47 Anderson (1974) 219-26; Khazanov (1984) ch. 5.
48 Croke (1977) with Zuckerman (1994) 162 n. 12.
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THEODOSIUS II 4I
evidently broke down and war ensued, but the sudden death of Rua (appar- ently struck by lightning) threw the Hun forces into disarray. He was suc- ceeded by his nephews Attila and Bleda, who took time to consolidate their position internally, before the empire’s concern to ensure peace on the Danube in preparation for its second expedition against the Vandals pre- sented them with the opportunity in 439/40 to extract further significant concessions, including an increase in the annual payments to 700 pounds of gold.”
Once the expedition for North Africa had departed, however, the Huns found a pretext for reneging on their agreement and attacked the empire, capturing a number of Danubian cities and plundering widely in Ilyricum and Thrace (441-2). The crack imperial troops bound for Africa were recalled from Sicily, and, faced by this threat, Hunnic forces withdrew. The empire then discontinued its annual payments to the Huns until, in 447, Attila — now sole ruler after the murder of Bleda (445) — took advantage of a concatenation of natural disasters — earthquake, famine and plague — to renew the offensive, this time with devastating effect.” Eastern forces were comprehensively defeated, there was widespread destruction in Thrace, the city of Constantinople itself was threatened, and the eastern empire was forced to make its most serious concessions yet. In addition to the now cus- tomary requirement that Hunnic fugitives be returned, Attila claimed all territory five days’ journey south of the lower Danube, and stipulated an annual payment of 2,100 pounds of gold (together with arrears of 6,000 pounds).”!
One immediate result of this disaster was the need to increase taxation, from which not even senatorial families escaped.” Priscus’ account may well engage in rhetorical exaggeration about the burden this entailed for senators, but the fact that everyone was obliged to contribute suggests strongly that Attila’s new demands did impose a strain on the empite’s resources. Another probable consequence was the construction of the Long Walls in Thrace, designed to afford greater protection to Constantinople and its immediate hinterland.*4 Yet another, indicative of the nadir to which Roman fortunes had sunk, was Chrysaphius’ scheme to assassinate Attila, a ‘solution’ to which the empire had had recourse a
* For the events of the 4308, I follow the persuasive reconstruction of Zuckerman ((1994) 160-3), who tevises the older accounts of Thompson ((1948) 70-8) and Maenchen-Helfen ((1973) 81-94) in significant respects. The other concessions comprised the return of Hunnic fugitives, a (high) fixed rate of ransom for Roman prisoners, agreement not to enter an alliance with any enemy of the Huns, and establishment of safe markets (Priscus fr. 2.29—38).
°° Again, I follow Zuckerman’s ((1994) 164-8) reinterpretation of the events of 441~7. See also ch. 23 (Whitby), pp. 704-8 below. 5 Blockley (1992) 63—4. Priscus fr. 9. 3.22—33.
53 Priscus’ rhetoric: Thompson (1948) 191-7; Jones, LRE 206-7. Jones’s minimizing of the burden seems to take no account of Priscus’ statement that all had to contribute.
4 Whitby, Michael (1985), contra Croke (1982). Crow (1995) adds nothing to the debate about the date.
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42 2. THE EASTERN EMPIRE: THEODOSIUS TO ANASTASIUS
number of times over the past century when confronted by particularly intransigent barbarian leaders.°° On this occasion, the plan became known to Attila and failed, and the empire was fortunate to escape the conse- quences of his wrath relatively lightly, probably owing to the fact that his attention was now turning westwards.°°
There can be no doubt that the Huns, and Attila in particular, caused the eastern empire considerable damage and discomfort during Theodosius’ reign, whether in terms of the loss of productivity and revenue caused by Hunnic devastation of the Balkans,°” the financial drain of annual treaty payments, or the way in which the timing of Hunnic demands and inva- sions limited Constantinople’s freedom of action elsewhere. But while the situation was often grim, particularly for the inhabitants of the Balkans and particularly in 447, the period as a whole was not one of unremitting dis- aster in which the eastern empire was utterly helpless in the face of the Hunnic threat. Eastern armies undoubtedly suffered decisive defeats in 447, but they had also been able to force a Hunnic withdrawal a few years earlier.** The very fact that the Huns did so often time their diplomatic and military offensives to take advantage of temporary Roman handicaps or the absence of troops implies a healthy respect for Roman arms on the part of the Huns and helps to keep Hunnic successes in perspective. Attila’s death in 453 was to reveal just how fragile the foundations of his empire were, though Theodosius’ own demise in 450 meant that it was his successor who savouted the relief occasioned by that fortuitous turn of events — and who had also to cope with the first phase of its momentous consequences.
Il. THE SUCCESSORS OF THEODOSIUS
1. Marcian
Theodosius died on 28 July 450 from injuries sustained in a fall from his horse while hunting. His marriage to Eudocia had produced no male offspring,” and perhaps excusably, given the sudden and unexpected nature of his death, he had not made public any choice of successor. Nearly a month later, on 25 August, a new emperor was at last proclaimed in the person of an unknown fifty-eight-year-old former army officer of Balkan origin named Matcian. The long delay between Theodosius’ death and Marcian’s accession belies the reports, no doubt initiated by Marcian’s supporters, that the new emperor was Theodosius’ deathbed choice. But if Theodosius did not promote Marcian, then someone else must have. The western emperor Valentinian HI was the one individual with an obvious claim to arbitrate in this matter, but
> Lee (forthcoming). 5° Blockley (1992) 66-7.
°7 On which see ch. 23 (Whitby), pp. 709-12 below. 8 Zuckerman (1994) 167-8. °° On the spurious ‘Arcadius 1’ of PLRE u, see Holum, Empresses 178 n. 14.
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THE SUCCESSORS OF THEODOSIUS 43
Marcian was certainly not his selection, since Valentinian pointedly refused to acknowledge his accession until March 452.°’ Some sources attribute the choice to Pulcheria, a possibility rendered plausible by her subsequent mat- tiage to Marcian, but one which there are in fact strong reasons to doubt.”! Aspar is more credible as kingmaker in 450: Marcian had served as aide to Aspar and his father for fifteen years, and Aspar’s son Ardabur was promoted to a high military command soon after Marcian’s accession. Yet Aspar himself was not in a strong position during Theodosius’ final years — unlike Flavius Zeno, who also benefited from Marcian’s rise. Strange though the notion of co-operation between Aspar and Zeno may seem, Marcian may in fact have been their joint candidate.
Whatever the solution to this conundrum, there can be no doubt that Marcian’s accession signalled significant change. Chrysaphius was quickly eliminated, and with him went the major policies with which he had been identified: Marcian refused to make any further annual payments to Attila and soon took steps to overturn the results of the recent second council of Ephesus. If Zeno played a key role in Marcian’s promotion, then this would help to explain the reversal of policy towards Attila, Zeno having been a staunch critic of the payments during Theodosius’ final years. It is less likely, however, to account for the change in ecclesiastical policy, for Zeno was a pagan. Pulcheria, however, had a deep interest in the latter area, and undoing the second council of Ephesus may have been her guid pro quo for agreeing to marry Marcian, an essential step towards legitimating his rule.“
Marriage to Pulcheria did not, however, solve all his problems on this front. His undistinguished background was an impediment to winning sen- atorial support, and Valentinian’s refusal to acknowledge his accession left a worrying question mark over his right to rule. His changes of policy can also be seen as strategies for overcoming these immediate political handi- caps. A tough line towards Attila as he moved to invade Gaul was a good way of expressing solidarity with the west and, hopefully, of earning the gratitude and recognition of Valentinian, while the termination of pay- ments to Attila permitted tax concessions and so stood to gain the new emperor much-needed domestic support, particularly from the senatorial
Burgess (1993-4) 63. One source (John Ant. Excerpta de insidiis (de Boor) 85) even suggests that Valentinian would have taken steps to remove Matcian had he not been opposed in this by Aetius.
51 Burgess (1993-4).
% This is the proposal of Zuckerman (1994) 169-76, who argues that Aspar had been removed from his command after the defeats of 447, whereas Zeno had effective control of the only two eastern field armies not damaged in that débacle and was therefore the most powerful general at the time of Theodosius’ death. Moreover, Zeno’s elevation to the distinction of pafricius must date to the beginning of Marcian’s reign (174 n. 56), and Marcian’s reversal of policy on subsidies to Attila coincides with Zeno’s views on this issue.
6 Zuckerman (1994) 176 observes the irony of this. Of course, Zeno’s hostility towards Chrysaphius may have inclined him to overturn as many as possible of the lattet’s policies, irrespective of where Zeno’s personal sympathies lay. & Cf. Burgess (1993-4) 65. 6 Hohlfelder (1984) Go.
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44 2. THE EASTERN EMPIRE: THEODOSIUS TO ANASTASIUS
atistocracy,°° whose good will was further courted by the abolition of the
tax on senatorial land known as the collatio glebalis or follis.°’ The senatorial aristocracy also appears to have resented the direction of ecclesiastical policy in Theodosius’ final years, so that a reversal on this front might be expected further to increase their sympathy for the new regime,” as well as winning the favour of pope Leo who in turn had influence with Valentinian’s court at Ravenna.”
The embodiment of Marcian’s ecclesiastical policy was the oecumenical council held at Chalcedon in 451, a watershed in the history of the church. Dioscorus of Alexandria, the instigator of the Second Council of Ephesus, was condemned and deposed; those in whose condemnation he had been instrumental in 449 — Flavian of Constantinople and other supposed Nestorian sympathizers — were rehabilitated; and a formula was sanctioned which aimed to find common ground between the Antiochene and Alexandrian positions on the relationship of the human and the divine in Christ. The council brought immediate benefits for Marcian — he was hailed as a new Constantine and relations between Constantinople and the pope were much improved — but the Chalcedonian formula failed to reunite the warring factions and, if anything, served to harden divergent tendencies. In the eyes of supporters of the Alexandrian school of thought, it still made too many concessions to unacceptable Antiochene ideas, and the rejection of Chalcedon became a rallying-cry which strengthened their sense of sep- arate identity and gave rise during the ensuing decades to the so-called Monophysite movement. Moreover, although the Chalcedonian definition was compatible with Antiochene teaching, the council also reaffirmed Nestorius’ condemnation as a heretic, prompting some adherents of the Antiochene tradition also to reject Chalcedon and furthering the process through which an independent Nestorian church eventually emerged.
The strength of popular feelings aroused by Chalcedon may be gauged from the fact that Marcian was obliged to use military force to maintain pro-Chalcedonian bishops in office in Alexandria and Jerusalem, and when news of Marcian’s death reached the former city in 457, the incumbent was lynched and replaced by an anti-Chalcedonian candidate whom Marcian’s successor was in turn only able to replace by deploying troops. Of course, incidents of this sort simply served to reinforce popular antagonism towards Chalcedon and strengthen support for Monophysite theology in Egypt and Palestine, and increasingly even in Syria.”
6 Jones, LRE 219.
67 CJ xu1.2.2 (450-5). Barnish (1989) discusses the evidence for how significant a source of income this was for the government. % Gregory (1979) 141-2, 166.
© Stein (1959) 1.312; Jones, LRE 219.
7 Frend, Monophysite Movement 148-69; Gray, Defence of Chalcedon 17-25; Meyendorff, Imperial Unity 187-90.
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THE SUCCESSORS OF THEODOSIUS 45
Marcian enjoyed more enduring success in foreign relations. His policy towards the Huns enraged Attila, but preoccupation with his campaigns in Gaul and Italy during 451-2 meant that he was unable to make good his dire threats. No doubt Attila’s lack of success in the west and Valentinian’s eventual recognition of Marcian in 452 strengthened Marcian’s resolve in pursuing this course, but it is not difficult to understand why he should have been regarded as fortunate when Attila unexpectedly died in 453.’! The importance of Attila’s personal authority in maintaining the coherence of the Hunnic empire soon became apparent as his sons fell to fighting over their inheritance and the various subject peoples seized the opportunity to assert their independence, culminating in the battle at the river Nedao (454).’2 The consequences of all this were to be a continuing anxiety for Constantinople for most of the remainder of the century, but Attila’s death certainly marked the beginning of the end of Hunnic power.
The early years of Marcian’s reign also witnessed other successes on the military/diplomatic front: Arab attacks in the east were repulsed in late 451/early 452,” while offensives into Egypt by Nobades and Blemmyes, tribesmen from the south, were defeated in 453.’ At the time of his death Marcian was planning an expedition against Carthage, an understandable reaction to the Vandal sack of Rome in 455 and the abduction of the western empress Eudoxia and her daughters,” but though he had himself portrayed as a conquering hero,’° his regime otherwise avoided unneces- sary foreign commitments, which, together with the ending of payments to Attila, must go a long way towards explaining the healthy reserve of more than 100,000 lbs of gold which he had accumulated by the end of his reign.”
2. Leo
Marcian died on 27 January 457 at the age of 65.’* There was never any prospect of his marriage to Pulcheria producing an heir: Marcian had agreed to respect her vow of chastity and she was already beyond child- bearing age anyway. Marcian may have hoped that the succession would pass to his son-in-law Anthemius, who had received rapid promotion
1 Jord. Rom. 333.” Thompson (1948) 152-4; Maenchen-Helfen (1973) 143-52.
® Priscus fr. 26; Nicephorus xv.9; Shahid (1989) 5 5—7.
™ Priscus fr. 27,1 with Zuckerman (1994) 176-9. Mathisen (1981) 242-3.
76 Anth. Pal. X.802 (statue of Marcian on horseback trampling on a defeated enemy).
77 John. Lyd. De Mag. 111.44 for the figure. Marcian’s rapid creation of this surplus has been taken as proof that payments to the Huns cannot have been that serious a problem and that the reserve must already have been building up under Theodosius: Thompson (1948) 194; Hendy, Studies 264. But if Theodosius already had a reserve of any substance in place by 447, then surely he would have avoided imposing new and obviously unpopular taxes to meet Attila’s demand. Moreover, it can be argued that the growth of the surplus during the years after the termination of the payments in 450 shows just how serious a burden they had previously been. 78 For the details, see Croke (1978).
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46 2. THE EASTERN EMPIRE: THEODOSIUS TO ANASTASIUS
during the mid 450s,” but, if so, those hopes were not realized. An element of uncertainty remains concerning the manoeuvrings behind Marcian’s own assumption of the purple, but the sources are explicit in stating that the succession in 457 was determined by Aspar, who preferred another can- didate.*’ His choice was similar to Marcian in many respects — a relative nonentity of Balkan origin, in his mid fifties and from a military back- ground, named Leo.*! Formal legitimation was a more serious problem this time: recognition from the west was not an issue (Valentinian had been assassinated in 455 and the ensuing chaos was still unresolved), but there was no female member of the Theodosian household available to provide a convenient dynastic link through marriage.*’ The character of the cere- monial accompanying Leo’s accession — much more elaborate than what is known of previous such occasions and, interestingly, displaying an appar- ently novel ‘liturgical’ dimension — is highly significant in the light of this.™
Aspar no doubt promoted the unknown Leo in the expectation of being able to exercise a predominant influence in the affairs of state, and the way in which his sons and kinsmen monopolized the consulship during Leo’s early years is one measure of his success.** By the mid 460s, however, Leo showed himself prepared to follow his own mind. Sources refer to dis- agreements between the two over certain high officials and over a foreign policy decision, and in the latter case Leo certainly prevailed.®° It must also have been in the mid 460s that he began pursuing a longer-term plan designed to free himself completely from dependence on the Alan general. Aspat’s strength lay particularly in the support of the Goths serving in the army, but from the mid 460s Leo sought to counterbalance this by drawing on manpower from Isauria, a rugged, mountainous region in south- western Anatolia whose inhabitants had a reputation for brigandage and savagery on a pat with foreign barbarians but who were also, for this very
” Anthemius, grandson of the powerful praetorian prefect of Theodosius IIs early years, married Marcian’s daughter (from a previous matriage) in 45 3/4; for further details, see PLRE u1, s.. Anthemius 3. If Anthemius did have such aspirations in 457, Leo’s choice of him for the western throne in 467 might in part be explained by a concern to mollify an aggrieved party, while also conveniently remov- ing him from the eastern scene.
8° Priscus fr. 19; Candidus fr. 1.4, 25-6. Aspar’s power in 457 is confirmed by pope Leo effectively treating him as co-tuler: Leo, Epp. 149.2, 150, 153 (= PL iv.1120, 1121, 1123). Flavius Zeno had died during Marcian’s reign, possibly as early as late 451 (Zuckerman (1994) 175).
51 Two sources, but both late (Theophanes p. 116.78, Zonaras x111.25), also report that Leo had once been in the service of Aspar.
82 Pulcheria had died in 453, predeceased by Theodosius’ other three sisters; Theodosius’ second daughter Flacilla had died in 431, while his first, Eudoxia, widow of Valentinian HI, was a prisoner in Carthage. 83 De Caer. 1.91, with Nelson (1976), MacCormack (1981) 240-7.
84 His second son, Patricius, was consul in 459, his third, Herminericus, in 465 (his eldest, Ardabur, had already held it in 447), and Dagalaifus, husband of his granddaughter, held the consulship in 46r. They also held various military or administrative posts of importance.
55 Foreign policy: Priscus fr. 45 (dated to «. 466 in PLRE u1, sv. Fl. Ardabur Aspar); officials: Candidus fr, 1.28—30, who places this after the great fire of 464, though he does not explain the point at issue or the outcome.
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THE SUCCESSORS OF THEODOSIUS 47
reason, excellent fighters.*° Isaurians were drafted into the army on an
increased scale, and probably also into the new élite bodyguard of the excu- bitores which Leo established as a further way of trying to ensure his inde- pendence.*’
A necessary part of this strategy was Leo’s advancement to high military rank of a leading Isaurian chieftain, Tarasicodissa, who changed his bar- baric-sounding name to Zeno, hoping by its Greekness and the reputation which his fellow countryman of that name had enjoyed in the late 440s and eatly 4508 to mitigate the prejudice which attached to his Isaurian origins.™ He discredited Aspar’s son Ardabur on charges of treasonable communi- cation with Persia (466), secured marriage to Leo’s elder daughter Ariadne (466/7),® and held the consulship (469). Although Aspar was in turn able to pressure Leo into not only marrying his younger daughter Leontia to another of his sons, Patricius, but also declaring that son emperor- designate, Zeno steadily eclipsed Aspar as the leading influence in the state, to the point where Leo finally had Aspar and Ardabur murdered (471),”° winning him the epithet ‘the butcher’ and leaving the way clear for Zeno effectively to succeed him in 474.
There was a significant degree of continuity of policy between the reigns of Marcian and Leo. Leo was a supporter of Chalcedonian orthodoxy and also initiated further measures against pagans and heretics, including a blanket exclusion from the legal profession of anyone not an orthodox Christian.”! For the first decade of his reign, he also sought diplomatic solutions to foreign-policy issues. In one area, however — the lower Danube — he faced increasing problems arising from the break-up of Attila’s empire, while in a second area — relations with the Vandals — he eventually abandoned a cautious approach for a more aggressive one — with disastrous consequences.
Some of Attila’s sons remained a disruptive presence along the Danube during the 460s — Dengizich’s abortive invasion of 468 is the best- documented example” — but more problematic were the peoples previ- ously subject to the Huns who gained their independence during the years
56 For the Isaurians’ reputation, see e.g. Philostorg, HE x1.8, Theodoret, Ep. 40 (Azéma), Joshua Styl. Chron. 12. For the region and its history: Matthews (1989) 35 5-67; Hopwood (1986), (1989); Shaw 1990). 87 Leo and the Isaurians: Brooks (1893) 211-15; excubitores: Haldon (1984) 136-8.
99 93 5 9 3
88 For the name, see Feissel (1984) 564 n. 105, contra Harrison (1981); for his career to 474, see PLRE u, sv Fl. Zeno 7.
® The suggestion of Pingree ((1976) 146-7) that Zeno was engaged to Ariadne as early as 463 is doubtful; cf. Dagron (1982) 275.
° For the fates of Patricius and Herminericus, see PLRE 11, s.v, Tulius Patricius 15, Herminericus.
1 C71.4.15 (468), 1.11.8 (472?). Cf CJ 1.5.9-10. (For Marcian’s anti-pagan legislation, see CJ 1.11.7 451).) Leo’s guaestor Isocasius was accused of being a pagan, stripped of office and forced to undergo
5 q 8 2 pag PP’ 8 baptism (PLRE u, s.v. Isocasius), and Leo is also reported as enforcing anti-heretical legislation against one group of Arians (Malal. p. 372.3-5) — perhaps to spite the Arian Aspar?
° Thompson (1948) 154~60; Maenchen-Helfen (1973) 152-68.
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48 2. THE EASTERN EMPIRE: THEODOSIUS TO ANASTASIUS
following Attila’s death, the most important of whom were the Goths (though they were certainly not a unified people at this stage). During the late 450s and 460s, vatious groups of Goths are found in Pannonia (effectively no longer imperial territory since the 440s), while a second cluster was located within the empire in Thrace.”? Some of the latter had, by the 460s, acquired formal status as federate troops within the eastern empire with particular ties of loyalty to Aspar. Predictably, his assassination by Leo in 471 provoked a revolt, which Leo was only able to end (473) by making various concessions to their leader Theoderic Strabo — an annual payment of 2,000 pounds of gold, an imperial generalship for Strabo and recognition of him as the only Gothic leader with whom Constantinople would deal — but not before a substantial portion of the Pannonian Goths had seized the chance presented by Leo’s preoccupation with the revolt to invade the eastern empire, advance as far as Macedonia and extract conces- sions of their own in the form of land.” At Leo’s death, therefore, the sit- uation in the Balkans was one fraught with difficulties.
As for relations with the Vandals, during the decades following the abor- tive expedition against Carthage in 441, Vandal raiding had concentrated on the western Mediterranean, but had also increasingly impinged on the east,” to the extent that by the mid 460s there were fears of a Vandal attack on Alexandria” — an ominous prospect in the context of the grain supply. The Vandal abduction of the western empress Eudoxia and her daughters following the sack of Rome (455) had clearly provoked alarm and outrage in Constantinople, and was a continuing vexation so long as the imperial womenfolk remained prisoners in Carthage,”’ while the persecution of otthodox African Christians by the Arian Vandals must have been a further cause for concern in the east.”®
These varied circumstances help to explain why Leo eventually aban- doned diplomacy and took the fateful step of organizing another expedi- tion against Carthage. In preparation, he arranged in 467 for Marcian’s son-in-law Anthemius to occupy the then vacant imperial throne in the west, so that the following year a formidable eastern armada was able to
°3 Marcian is often given responsibility for their entry to the empire (on the basis of Jordanes), but there is good reason to think that at least some of the Pannonian Goths were placed there by Attila, and that at least some of the Thracian Goths had been settled there by the imperial authorities during the 420s (Heather, Goths and Romans 242-4, 259-63). °4 Heather, Goths and Romans ch. 7.
°5 Raiding in the east in the late 440s and early 450s: Priscus fr. 10.12—13 (with Croke (1983a) for the date), Jord. Rom. 333; attacks on Illyricum and Greece in the late 450s and 460s: Vict. Vit. Hist. Pers. 1.51, Procop. Wars 111.5.22—6.1, 22.16—18. °° V% Dan. Styl. 56.
°7 All but Eudocia were finally released ¢. 462; the soures are contradictory concerning the eventual fate of Eudocia, who was forced to marry Geiseric’s son, but it is likely she was still in Carthage in 468: see PLRE u1, s.v. Eudocia 1.
°8 Courtois ((1955) 292-3) is sceptical about Geiseric as a persecutor on the basis of a lack of martyrs during his reign, but persecution can entail other forms of discrimination, which are certainly in evidence in this period: Moorhead (1992b) xi—xii.
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THE SUCCESSORS OF THEODOSIUS 49
combine with western forces, while an eastern army also advanced towards Carthage along the coast from Egypt.” The difficulties of co-ordination inherent in such a strategy no doubt go far towards explaining the subse- quent débacle, though Geiseric’s skilful use first of diplomatic delay and then of fireships was also clearly important. It is less easy to determine whether the odium which fell on the eastern commander, Basiliscus, resulted from the need for a scapegoat or was genuinely deserved.'"” The ensuing disaster cost Constantinople dearly in terms of military and financial resources. The sources differ about the precise sums involved, but the most conservative estimate is still in excess of 64,000 pounds of gold —‘a sum that probably exceeded a whole year’s revenue’.'®! It is hardly sur- prising that one soutce talks of the entire state being shipwrecked — a par- ticularly apposite metaphor in the context.'"* In this respect, Leo left his successor a most unwelcome legacy.'”
3. Zeno
Leo’s wife Verina had given birth to a son of unknown name in 463, but he died when only five months old,' and when Leo himself succumbed to the effects of dysentery on 18 January 474 he was succeeded by his seven- year-old grandson Leo, son of Zeno and Ariadne, whom he had made co- emperor shortly before his death. Leo H, however, died ten months later, but not before having in turn raised his father to the rank of co-emperor.!° By thus gaining the throne, Zeno has a strong claim to be regarded as the most politically successful general in the fifth-century east. Once emperor, however, he had to channel most of his energies into clinging on to power, for his reign was overshadowed by a succession of revolts and usurpations — that of Basiliscus (who actually controlled Constantinople for twenty months during 475-6), of Marcian (who almost gained control of the capital in 479), and of Illus and Leontius (former supporters of Zeno’s
” Courtois ((1955) 202-4) gives priority to Theophanes’ version, whereby the army from Egypt becomes a quite separate campaign in 470, but this view has found little support (cf. Blockley (1992) 75-6, 212).
100 Accounts of Basiliscus’ less than glorious role in the expedition may have been coloured by the unpopularity he had earned by the end of his later usurpation (475-6).
101 Convenient summary of figures and quote in Hendy, Studies 221, 223. Courtois (1955) 202-4) downplays the size and cost of the expedition, arguing that they were inflated by sixth-century writers concerned to enhance the significance of Belisarius’ expedition (533). This is plausible in principle, but some of the relevant sources pre-date Justinian’s reign, his strictures against Priscus are unpersuasive, and the evidence of Candidus does not receive due consideration. 102 Joh. Lyd. De Mag. 111.44.
103 Suda © 3100 refers to the treasury being empty during Zeno’s reign, but its attribution to the alleged failings of Zeno is suspect (Cameron (1965) 505—G), and the financial repercussions of the dis- aster of 468 are a more plausible explanation (cf. Malchus fer. 3).
104 Pingree (1976) 146-7 with the important qualifications of Dagron (1982) 275.
105 ‘The sources do not even hint at any suspicious circumstances surrounding young Leo’s death (Croke (1983b) 82 n. 5), a silence of considerable import given Zeno’s subsequent unpopularity.
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5O 2. THE EASTERN EMPIRE: THEODOSIUS TO ANASTASIUS
regime who raised a revolt against him in Isauria itself during 484-8).'°° Those of Basiliscus and Marcian were inspired partly by resentment on the part of some of Leo’s relatives at their displacement by Zeno’s rise — Basiliscus was Leo’s brother-in-law, Marcian his son-in-law — and partly by public prejudice against uncouth Isaurians. Even before Zeno’s accession, this prejudice had manifested itself against the Isaurians increasingly resi- dent in Constantinople, many of whom were killed in a hippodrome riot in 473.'°’ Antagonism was heightened by Zeno’s promotion of fellow countrymen to positions of importance in the state, and when Basiliscus seized the throne in 475, large numbers of them were massacred in the capital.'°° Zeno’s struggle with his fellow countrymen Illus and Leontius, on the other hand, was much more of a power struggle between rival Isaurian chieftains, on this occasion played out on a far larger stage and for much higher stakes than usual.'
Zeno’s domestic political difficulties were compounded by the situation in the Balkans which he inherited from Leo, where there were now two rival groups of Goths in close proximity to the imperial capital, one of which (that of Theoderic Strabo) was hostile towards the new emperor, who had been no friend of their patron Aspar and was the chief beneficiary of his fall. This hostility soon found opportunity for expression, with the Thracian Goths lending their support to Basiliscus’ usurpation in 475.'!° It was not sufficient, however, to prevent Basiliscus’ downfall the following year, and upon Zeno’s return, the Thracian Goths found themselves displaced from their position of favour by the Pannonian Goths, with whom Zeno had established links during his enforced absence from Constantinople. The annual payments were now to go to the latter, and their leader, Theoderic the Amal, was given the generalship formerly held by Theoderic Strabo. In return for these favours, Zeno expected the Pannonian Goths to act against the Thracian Goths, but Theoderic the Amal soon came to believe (no doubt with some justice) that Zeno was actually trying to engineer the mutual destruction of the rival groups and he in turn revolted, leaving Zeno to patch up a fresh agreement with Strabo in 478.1"!
106 For narrative of these complex events, see Brooks (1893); Stein (1959) 1.363—4; Stein, Bas-Empire 11.15—20, 28-31. The part played in these events by Leo’s widow Verina is noteworthy in the context of influential imperial women. 107 Marcell. Chron. s.a. 473 with Croke (1995) 100.
108 Joshua Styl. Chron. 12; Candidus ft. 1.57.
10° There appeats also to have been a religious dimension to this struggle. Although Illus was a Christian, one of his leading supporters was the pagan Pamprepius and it is apparent that Illus’ revolt inspired hopes of a pagan revival among sections of the urban élite of the eastern empire (PLRE u1, s.v. Pamprepius; Zacharias Rhetor, 1. Severus (PO 11 (1907)) 40). However, the attempt to place certain anti-pagan measutes in this context (Irombley, Hellenic Religion 1.81-3 on CJ1.11.9—10) overlooks P Oxy. 1814 (line 16) which shows that the first of these laws is from Anastasius’ reign, in turn making it prob- able that the second is also later than Zeno.
"0 Malchus fr. 15.20-2; 2 Dan. Styl. 75; Heather, Goths and Romans 273-5.
111 Heather, Goths and Romans 275-93.
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THE SUCCESSORS OF THEODOSIUS 51
This already complicated sequence of developments then took yet another tortuous turn in 479 when Strabo’s backing of another usurper — on this occasion the unsuccessful Marcian — once more alienated him from Zeno. However, Strabo’s subsequent attempts to capture Constantinople (480) failed, and in the course of withdrawing into Greece the following year he fortuitously died. This simplified Zeno’s problem, but in the face of the growing challenge from Ilus and Leontius, Zeno now sought a new rapprochement with Theoderic the Amal, as a result of which the latter gained land for his people and a generalship and prestigious consulship for himself. He further consolidated his position by organizing the elimination of Strabo’s son and successor Recitach, thereby opening the way for the amalgamation of the Thracian Goths with his own. Although Theoderic provided Zeno with help in his campaign against Illus, Zeno continued to harbour doubts about Theoderic’s intentions and loyalty, and only arrived at a definitive solution to this problem, greatly protracted by the instability of Zeno’s own position, through the time-honoured tactic of setting one barbarian against another, in this case persuading Theoderic to lead his people to Italy (489) and challenge the Scirian general Odoacer who had been ruling the peninsula since deposing the last western emperor in 476.'1?
In the sphere of religious policy, Zeno’s reign was chiefly notable for his attempt to resolve the controversies arising from Chalcedon. The usurper Basiliscus had tried to win support for his regime in Egypt and Palestine by issuing an edict condemning Chalcedon, but this had the effect of provok- ing riots in the capital — Constantinople and the Balkans were for the most part staunchly pro-Chalcedonian. These riots, which had much mote direct implications for the viability of his regime, forced Basiliscus to retract the edict, but the damage was already done.'!’ Zeno showed a keen apptecia- tion of the lessons to be learned from Basiliscus’ failure when in 482 he issued his famous juggling-act known as the Henotikon or ‘formula of union’, through which he hoped to please everyone. It affirmed the con- demnation of both Nestorius and Eutyches, approved one of Cyril’s most important formulations (the so-called Twelve Anathemas), spoke of the one Christ without mentioning ‘natures’ or other terminology which had been a stumbling block in the past, and denounced any who had advanced different views at Chalcedon or any other council.
Zeno’s interest in establishing ecclesiastical harmony in the east is not hard to understand: his hold on power had been tenuous from the start and a breakthrough here offered the prospect of consolidating much-needed support for his regime. The Henotikon did not in fact meet with a rapturous reception in all quarters, but it achieved short-term success where it mattered
"2 Heather, Goths and Romans ch. 9; Moorhead (1984) 261-3. For Constantinople’s sometimes trou-
bled relations with Theoderic as ruler of Italy, see Moorhead (19924) ch. 6. "3 VZ Dan. Styl. 7o-85; Evagt. HE 111.7.
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52 2. THE EASTERN EMPIRE: THEODOSIUS TO ANASTASIUS
most for Zeno. Although extreme Monophysites were unhappy at its failure to condemn Chalcedon, others, including the patriarchs of Alexandria and Antioch, were willing to endorse it, as was the patriarch of Constantinople, Acacius (471-89), who rather surprisingly (given his see) was unenthusiastic about Chalcedon. In the west, the pope was incensed by its ambivalent atti- tude to Chalcedon and by Zeno and Acacius associating themselves with the Monophysite patriarchs, and threatened to excommunicate them (484). However, Zeno evidently judged that the benefits to be derived from a greater degree of harmony within the east outweighed the disadvantages of poor relations with the west. So began the so-called Acacian schism between Rome and Constantinople which was to last until Anastasius’ death.'"
Zeno was also responsible for the final closing of the school at Edessa (489) which had been an important centre for Antiochene theology in its Nestorian guise — another way of trying to win the support of both Monophysites and Chalcedonians. The closure was in fact largely symbolic, since the majority of the teachers had some time before realized that the tide of opinion in the eastern empire was increasingly against them and had therefore established themselves afresh across the border at Nisibis in Persia, from where they had long drawn many students anyway and where Nestorian Christianity was to have an enduring future.'!°
III. ANASTASIUS
1. Politics and administration
Zeno died from dysentery (or perhaps epilepsy) on 9 April 491. His mar- riage to Ariadne had produced no further male offspring after young Leo, another son from a previous marriage had also predeceased him,'!° and Zeno had nominated no successor. His brother Longinus believed that he had a good claim to the throne, but after the turmoil of Zeno’s reign there was little enthusiasm for another emperor of Isaurian origin. Court officials and senators promptly met to discuss the succession and, perhaps unable to agree on a suitable candidate themselves, they accepted the proposal of the chief chamberlain Urbicius that Zeno’s widow Ariadne be invited to nominate the successor. This surprising move must have been due not so much to Ariadne’s status as the widow of the unpopular Zeno, as to her being the daughter of Leo and the last surviving member of the imperial family previous to Zeno’s reign. It is another interesting, if unusual, example of the opportunities that both imperial eunuchs and imperial women sometimes had to influence political life during the fifth century, in
"4 Frend, Monophysite Movement 174-83; Gray, Defence of Chalcedon 28-34; Meyendorff, Imperial Unity 194-202. "5 Meyendorff, Imperial Unity 98-9. M6 PLRE wu, sv. Zeno 4.
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ANASTASIUS S35
the tradition of Chrysaphius on the one hand and Pulcheria, Eudocia and Verina on the other.'!”
If the decision to give Ariadne the choice was surprising, then the outcome of her deliberations was even more unexpected, for she selected a palace official named Anastasius, who was already sixty years of age and held heterodox theological views. Though this last characteristic became the cause of difficulties in the final years of his reign, he nevertheless proved to be in other respects a good choice, for he was to display a degree of political and administrative competence superior to that of any of his fifth-century predecessors. Once again, the lack of any dynastic link was a potential problem, but another elaborate accession ceremony (11 April 491) helped to offset this handicap, ''® while a month later Ariadne strength- ened his position immeasurably by marrying him.
Anastasius’ most pressing problem upon his accession was Isaurian resentment at the fact that Zeno had not been succeeded by his brother Longinus, which rapidly provoked a revolt in Isauria. Anastasius seized the initiative in Constantinople by despatching Longinus into exile and using the pretext of a hippodrome riot to expel all Isaurians from the capital. Rebel forces advancing against Constantinople from Isauria were defeated in late 492, though it took six years to reduce the various rebel strongholds in Isauria itself.''? Although this should not be equated with the pacification of Isauria,'”” it did mark the end of the Isaurian factor in political life at the centre, and Anastasius was not slow to capitalize, via victory ceremonial, panegyric and architecture, on the kudos to be gained from this success. !!
In addition to the Isaurian revolt, the early years of Anastasius’ reign were also troubled by frequent outbreaks of unrest in Constantinople and Antioch, some of it very pointedly directed at the emperor himself.'?* The violence regularly manifested itself at places of public entertainment, though why there should have been a sudden upsurge of such incidents in the 490s is not easy to determine.’” Anastasius responded initially by sending in troops, with much resultant bloodshed, and then by banning
"7 Ariadne does not, however, appear to have exercised any sustained influence; it is known, for example, that Anastasius turned down her request for the promotion of a particular individual to the praetorian prefectship (Joh. Lyd. De Mag. 111.50). Urbicius was a man of vast experience, having already served most eastern emperors during the fifth century: PLRE 1, sv. Vrbicius 1.
"8 De Caer. 1.92 with Nelson (1976), MacCormack (1981) 240-7.
"9 Brooks (1893) 231-7; Stein, Bas-Empire 11.82—4.
120 Shaw (1990) 25 5-9, contra Jones, LRE 230-1.
121 Victory ceremonial: McCormick, Evernal Victory 61; panegytic: Procopius of Gaza, Panegyric 9-10; Priscian, De lande Anast. 15-139; Suda s.v. Christodorus (a six-book epic entitled /saurika; cf. Colluthus’ Persika a decade later); architecture: Anth. Pal. 1x.656 (a palace built to commemorate his victory). The abolition of the chrysargyron (see p. 54 below) was also timed to coincide with celebrations of the Isaurian victory: Chauvot (1986) 154; McCormick, Evernal Victory 61.
122 Cameton (1973) 233—4 lists the incidents with references; see esp. John Ant. fr. 214b (= FHG v.29—30) and Matcell. Chron. s.a. 493 with Croke (1995) 107, when statues of the emperor were pulled down. 123 For discussion of possible causes, see Cameron (1973) 234-40.
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54 2. THE EASTERN EMPIRE: THEODOSIUS TO ANASTASIUS
wild-beast shows (498) and pantomimes (502).'*4 His decision to abolish the highly unpopular tax known as the co//atio /ustralis or chrysargyron (498) should perhaps also be understood in this context, as a more positive response to this problem. The chrysargyron was a tax on urban traders and craftsmen, and its abolition may have been an attempt to counteract popular hostility in the cities by gaining good will towards the emperor from at least one important sector of the urban community.
Despite his abolition of this tax!”° and his granting of tax remissions in areas of the empire adversely affected by natural disasters or warfare,'° and despite other significant expenses incurred during this reign — major building ptojects!*’ and war against the Isaurians and, later, the Persians (see pp. 58-9 below) — Anastasius nevertheless managed over the course of his reign to accumulate a massive reserve of 320,000 pounds of gold.'** This figure is tes- timony to Anastasius’ skill in financial management, or at the very least to his skill in selecting officials with the requisite abilities in this area. Three policies seem to have played particularly important parts in achieving this astonish- ing result. The first, evident in Anastasius’ laws, was a concerted effort on the part of the emperor and his officials to minimize waste and unnecessary expenditure through such measures as increased use of adaeratio (commuta- tion of the land-tax in kind to gold). The second was the creation by one of Anastasius’ praetorian prefects, Marinus, of a new category of officials, the vindices, who assumed responsibility for overseeing the collection of the land- tax in place of city councillors, a move which is likely to have reduced the scope for abuses on the part of the latter.'” The third, perhaps less obviously, was Anastasius’ currency reform, modelled, interestingly, on recent changes in Vandalic Africa and the new Gothic regime of Theoderic in Italy.'°°
Although fourth-century emperors had managed to keep the value of the gold solidus stable, attempts to do the same for the copper nummus had been unsuccessful, and its steady loss of value encouraged the continuation of inflationary trends. Anastasius’ reform of 498 created a new set of copper coins valued at forty, twenty and ten summi. They had specified weights which fixed their relationship with the so/dus, these weights were later doubled (512), at which time an additional five “ummi denomination was added.'*' A number of significant consequences ensued. The initial issuing of the new coins in 498 slowed inflationary trends, while their doubling in
124 Bans: Joshua Styl. Chron. 34, 46; cf. Procopius of Gaza, Panegyric 15-16, Priscian, De aude Anast. 223-8; Cameron (1973) 228-32.
125 Tn spite of its unpopularity, its abolition may not, in any case, have represented that great a loss to the government: Bagnall, Egypt 15 3-4. 126 Jones, LRE 237.
127 Malal. p. 409; Capizzi (1969) ch. 6. 128 Procop. SH 19.7.
129 Jones, LRE 235-6; Chrysos (1971); Chauvot (1987).
130 Metcalf (1969); Hendy, Studies 478-90.
31 Hendy, Studies 475-8, contra Jones, LRE 443 (who associates the five nummi coin with the initial reform of 498).
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ANASTASIUS 55
weight in turn began to reverse those trends; the new coins made life easier for ordinary consumers by reducing the quantity of low-value nummi they needed to carry around; and because the specified value of the copper coins in relation to the gold soidus was greater than the actual cost of the copper used in their production, it is likely that the imperial treasury made a profit from selling them to the public in return for so/idi.'*?
Despite the rejoicing occasioned by his abolition of the chrysargyron and the benefits of the currency reform for ordinary people, Anastasius’ accu- mulation of a surplus and some of the means by which this was achieved earned him an unwarranted reputation for avarice.’ In fact his compe- tence, and that of senior officials, in the unspectacular but crucial area of imperial finance made a significant contribution to the recovery of the eastern empire’s fortunes, and constituted one of the major achievements of his reign.
2. Religious affairs
Asa native of Dyrrhachium in the Balkans, Anastasius might reasonably have been expected to be an unequivocal supporter of Chalcedon, but this did not prove to be the case. Like Justinian, he had aspirations to be a theologian, and the result of his deliberations was considerable sympa- thy with the Monophysite cause.'*4 This was already known at the time of his accession, so that the pro-Chalcedonian patriarch of Constantinople, Euphemius (490-5), at first opposed his nomination and then, when overruled by Ariadne and the senate, demanded that he sign a declaration that he would not abrogate Chalcedon.'* Anastasius’ initial policy — to continue trying to maintain a degree of ecclesiastical stability in the east on the basis of the Henotikon — was not incompatible with this, but Euphemius’ subsequent attempts to achieve reconciliation with Rome by effectively abandoning the Henotikon threatened the success of that policy and eventually led Anastasius to have Euphemius deposed on charges of Nestorianism (495). His successor was Macedonius (495-511), who ini- tially supported Anastasius’ approach.
Antioch also posed problems for Anastasius. The patriarch Flavian (498-512), while personally sympathetic to Chalcedon, referred only to his adherence to the Henotikon in official pronouncements, thereby accommo- dating himself to Anastasius’ aims. Some Syrian Monophysites, however,
132 Jones, LRE 444; Metcalf (1969) (though he questions whether the reform contributed anything to Anastasius’ surplus (p. 12)).
133 Eg. Malal. p. 408; Joh. Lyd. De Mag. 111.46; Anth. Pal. x1.271; John Ant. fr. 215 (= FHG 1.621).
134 ‘The heterodox theological views of his mother and an uncle may also have played a part: see PLRE tu, s.v. Anastasius 4 for references.
185 Evaer. HE ut.32; Theodore Lector, HE 446 (Hansen pp. 125.25-126.15); Vict. Tunn. Chron. s.a.
491.
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were unhappy with Flavian’s failure to condemn Chalcedon and began a concerted propaganda and diplomatic campaign to persuade Anastasius to remove him. Meanwhile, in Constantinople itself, Macedonius began reverting to the capital’s more usual uncompromising adherence to Chalcedon, while the highly articulate Monophysite theologian Severus, also present in the capital (508-11), brought further pressure to bear on Anastasius from the anti-Chalcedonian side.'*°
It is against this background of increasing polarization that Anastasius’ adoption of a less neutral stance from 511 onwards must be understood. Like Zeno, Anastasius understandably viewed stability in the east as a more important priority than reconciliation with the west, and accordingly took various steps to ensure that he retained the support of Monophysites — first through the deposition of Macedonius at Constantinople, then through the deposition of Flavian at Antioch (in favour of Severus), and finally through decreeing the inclusion of controversial Monophysite phraseol- ogy in the liturgy of the capital’s churches. The reaction to this last move was more extreme than Anastasius can have anticipated. There were several days of serious rioting (November 512), during which much blood was shed and parts of the city were burnt, but most worrying was the over- throw of statues of Anastasius accompanied by calls for a new emperor. Anastasius’ response was to appear in the hippodrome without his diadem and to offer his abdication — a course of action which quelled the unrest.'*’ While this may seem an idiosyncratic way of dealing with such a crisis, it is perhaps better viewed as a remarkable demonstration of the susceptibility of the capital’s populace to a calculated display of imperial piety.
It did not, however, mark the end of religious turmoil, for Anastasius’ actions of 511-12 provoked a further serious challenge to his position, a revolt orchestrated by an army officer, Vitalian, who commanded units of barbarian federates in Thrace.'** The failure of their supplies to arrive in 513 and dissatisfaction among the regular troops with the magister militum for Thrace, Hypatius,'*’ enabled Vitalian to win their support,'*” but the teal issue for him — as indeed for many inhabitants of the Balkans — was Anastasius’ stance on Chalcedon. That this was not a mere pretext for Vitalian’s personal ambitions is indicated by the way he was prepared, on the first two occasions when he advanced against Constantinople (513 and 514), to withdraw after Anastasius agreed to take steps which offered the hope of resolving the religious issue. His willingness to do so, particularly
186 Frend, Monophysite Movement ch. 5; Gray, Defence of Chalcedon 34-40; Meyendorff, Imperial Unity 202-6.
137 Bvaer. HE 111.44; Malal. pp. 407-8; Marcell. Chron. s.a. 511-12 with Croke (1995) 114-16.
138 For full details, see Stein, Bas-Empire 11.178—-85; Capizzi (1969) 123-7; PLRE u1, s.v, Fl. Vitalianus 2; Croke (1995) 117-19. 139 Probably not the nephew of Anastasius: Cameron (1974) 313-14.
M40 John Ant. fr. 214e (= FHG v.32).
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the second time after Anastasius’ original promises of 513 had proven empty, is strong evidence for this being his genuine motivation. When Anastasius once mote failed to fulfil his side of the bargain, Vitalian advanced a third time (515), but on this occasion suffered a military defeat sufficiently serious for him to have to abandon any further attempts to capture the capital, and it was only after Anastasius’ death and the acces- sion of the Illyrian Justin that a resolution of the issue acceptable to Vitalian became possible. Anastasius survived this crisis, but his reign showed that the Henottkon was not a satisfactory basis for attaining an enduring settlement of the east’s ecclesiastical difficulties. In acknowledg- ing Anastasius’ failure in this area, however, it is worth remembering that his Chalcedonian successors were not to find it any easier to achieve a solu- tion to this intractable problem.
3. Foreign relations
Anastasius’ priorities in foreign relations proved to be rather different from those of his predecessors. Although the failure of Leo’s expedition in 468 had left the eastern Mediterranean vulnerable to further Vandal depreda- tions,’ the death of the long-lived Geiseric in 477 and growing domestic problems with Moorish tribesmen led to a less confrontational stance on the part of Geiseric’s successors and much mote stable relations between Constantinople and the Vandals over the next half-century!” — a stability reflected in the archaeological and numismatic evidence for a substantial increase in trade between the eastern Mediterranean and Carthage during the last quarter of the fifth and first quarter of the sixth century.'4? The Danube frontier was rather more problematic, in part because of the way the empire’s defensive infrastructure in that region had suffered extended neglect during Zeno’s reign. So long as the various Gothic groups were active in Hlyricum and Thrace, they effectively cushioned the empire from the consequences of this neglect, but soon after Theoderic’s departure for Italy, the empire began to feel the effects in the form of invasions by peoples referred to in contemporary sources as Bulgars, generally taken to be descendants of the Huns who survived north of the Danube after the break-up of Attila’s empire. Between 493 and 502, they are known to have made three significant thrusts into the Balkans.'** Anastasius took various steps to try to remedy the deficiencies of fortifications in the region,
141 Of which there were some in the early 470s: Courtois (1955) 197.
12 Stein, Bas-Empire 1.5 9-60. 43 Pulford (1980).
44 Marcell. Chron. s.a. 493, 499, 502 with Croke (1995) 108, 110, 111. The first record of involve- ment with the empire is Zeno’s attempt to use them against Strabo in 480 (John Ant. fr. 211 (4) (= FHG 1v.619)). The observations in CJ x.27.2.10 (491/505) on the debilitated economic state of Thrace perhaps reflect the impact of the Bulgars in addition to that of the Goths.
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including, probably, repair of the Long Walls in Thrace which had been damaged by the great earthquake of 479,’ and nothing further is heard of depredations across the Danube until the final years of his reign.'*°
The major foreign policy issue during Anastasius’ reign, however, was Persia, with whom relations had been relatively untroubled throughout the fifth century. Tensions had undoubtedly existed, notably over the treatment of religious minorities within both empires'*’ and over Persian demands for Roman financial assistance with the defence of the Caucasian passes, from which, the Persians argued, the Romans derived as much benefit as Persia.'** These tensions, however, had only escalated into warfare on the two brief occasions already noted during Theodosius’ reign, for Persia also faced many other problems comparable in gravity to those confronting the Romans during this period. In the second half of the fifth century, the Persians had to deal with another nomadic people, the Hephthalites, who captured the Persian king Peroz in one campaign and killed him in a second. Succession crises and Armenian revolts at various points created further distractions, and then in the final decade of the century, Kavadh’s radical social reforms, probably designed to weaken the power of the Persian aris- tocracy, resulted in social upheaval and his temporary deposition ( 4 96-8).'°
It was Kavadh who initiated war with the Romans in 502, ostensibly over the issue of Roman subsidies for the defence of the Caucasian passes, but probably as much because such a campaign offered the hope of uniting a recently strife-torn state against a common enemy. The Romans were slow to react to Kavadh’s invasion — perhaps partly because of preoccupation with the Bulgar invasion of that year and a major Arab raid’*’ — and his forces quickly captured Armenian Theodosiopolis, Martyropolis and Amida. That Kavadh’s invasion created considerable uncertainty and inse- curity in the empire’s eastern provinces is indicated by the contemporary piece of apocalyptic literature emanating from the region known as the ‘Oracle of Baalbek’.!>! It took Roman forces until 505 to effect the recov- ery of Amida, by which time Kavadh found himself having to deal with another Hephthalite invasion and was therefore amenable to a seven-year truce (which in practice lasted until 527).'°? The deficiencies of Roman
145 Long Walls: Whitby (1985); generally: Capizzi (1969) 204-6.
146 Marcell. Chron. s.a. 517 (it is unclear whether the Ge/ae referred to here are Bulgars or Slavs: cf. Bury, LRE 1.436 n. 2; Stein, Bas-Empire 11.105—6; Croke (1995) 120).
47 Bg. Soc. HE vi.18.1-7 (persecution of Persian Christians); Priscus fr. 41.1 (persecution of Zoroastrians living in the Roman empire). M48 Blockley (1985).
149 Frye (1984) 321-4. Fora different interpretation of some aspects of Kavadh’s reforms, see Crone (1991), with corrections of detail by Whitby (1994) 249 n. 72.
150 Marcell. Chron. s.a. 502; Theophanes p. 143.20-7. 151 Alexander (1967).
182 The most important source for this war is the contemporary Chronicle attributed to Joshua Stylites. For modern accounts, see Bury, LRE 11.10-15; Capizzi (1969) 180-5; Blockley (1992) 89-91.
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defences in the region revealed by the war resulted in action to repair and strengthen them and in the construction of a new frontier fortress at Dara, the aim of which was to provide a forward base for Roman troops.!°? This last move provoked strong protests from the Persians, since a fifth-century settlement had prohibited any new forts close to the frontier, but by the time Kavadh had dealt with the Hephthalites and was in a position to trans- late protest into action, he was confronted by a Roman fait accompl. Anastasius’ judicious use of diplomacy and money apparently dissuaded him from pursuing the issue further,'°* and relations between the two empires thereafter remained stable until the reign of Anastasius’ successor.
4. Epilogue
Anastasius died on 9 July 518. Given his age and the availability of suitable candidates among his relatives,'°° his failure to nominate a successor rep- resents an uncharacteristic oversight on the part of an emperor who had, in most areas of government, shown himself to be energetic and intelli- gent, and had done much to ensure the continuing viability of the eastern empire. That continuing viability, of course, stands in marked contrast to the demise of the western empire, and prompts reflection on the question posed in the introduction to this chapter as to why the fate of the east during the fifth century diverged from that of the west. Needless to say, the following observations make no claim to comprehensive coverage of all the major issues which bear on this subject. In keeping with the focus of the chapter, they concentrate primarily on the emperor and his policies in key areas.
One feature of imperial behaviour in the fifth century which distin- guishes it sharply from that in the third and fourth centuries is the way in which it became rare for the emperor to participate personally in military campaigning. This development arose in the first instance out of the youth and inexperience of Arcadius and Honorius, and then of Theodosius II and Valentinian HI (whose collective reigns, it is worth recalling, account for the first half of the fifth century). However, the way in which it remained the pattern thereafter until the early seventh century, in spite of the military experience of many subsequent incumbents, suggests that a mote fundamental consideration was also at work — namely, concern to protect the emperor from the political and physical consequences of mili- tary defeat, which the fates of Julian and Valens in the latter half of the fourth century had particularly highlighted.!°° The corresponding disad- vantage of this change was that it limited the emperor’s contact with the
153 Dara: Whitby (1986b); other sites: Capizzi (1969) 206-7, 214-28; Whitby (1986a) 726.
54 Procop. Wars t.10.13-19. 155 For the relatives, see Cameron, Alan (1978). 156 Cf, Whitby (1992).
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army and increased the potential for ambitious generals to exert a dominat- ing influence on political life — a potential realized in the careers of Stilicho, Aetius and Ricimer in the west. That this trend was less evident in the east can be attributed in large part to differences in the military command struc- ture in the two halves of the empire. In the early-fifth-century west (prob- ably as a result of Stilicho’s actions) all forces were ultimately under the authority of one general, whereas in the east the field armies were through- out the fifth century divided amongst five generals.'°’ This arrangement not only acted as a safeguard against the concentration of military power in the hands of one individual, it also diverted commanders’ energies into rivalries between themselves. Moreover, it enlarged the scope for others — civilian officials, prominent courtiers, female members of the imperial family — to compete for power and counterbalance the political weight of the military.'°
In the middle of the fifth century, to be sure, Aspar came to exercise influence analogous to that of the western ‘generalissimos’, yet when Leo began to assert his independence, Aspar never gave any sign of contem- plating his removal in the way that Ricimer eliminated Majorian and Anthemius, thereby seriously devaluing the authority of the imperial office in the west. Whether from choice or necessity, Aspar pursued the much less destructive strategy of establishing a marital alliance with Leo in the expec- tation that his son would succeed to the throne in due course. In the event, Aspar lost out to another general of ambition and ability. Unencumbered by Aspat’s dual handicap of barbarian origin and religious heterodoxy, Zeno was able to assume the imperial purple himself via the same strategy of marriage into the imperial family, so preserving the integrity of the imperial office in the east and helping to ensure that it never came to be viewed as an irrelevancy or an anachronism. Granted Zeno did not prove to be a popular emperor and the political turmoil of his reign raised the spectre of the eastern empire disintegrating into anarchy, yet it is note- worthy that, of those who challenged him for power, Basiliscus and Marcian had dynastic links, while Illus and Leontius came from the same provincial background as Zeno himself. Even if any of them had suc- ceeded in removing Zeno permanently, therefore, there was never any question of the imperial office itself being done away with.!°” Had the reign of his successor been as tumultuous as Zeno’s, then perhaps questions might have been asked. As it was, Anastasius proved to be a very capable
157 Jones, LRE 609-10.
158 ‘Through their marriages, the two most important imperial females — Pulcheria and Ariadne — also played a crucial role in maintaining a high degree of dynastic continuity during the fifth century (Leo’s accession marks the only break), and the significance of that continuity for preserving the integ- rity of the imperial office ought not to be underestimated.
159 Basiliscus, of course, actually adopted the title of emperor during his twenty-month occupation of Constantinople.
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ruler whose policies by and large served to stabilize the empire, which at his death was in most respects in a stronger position than it had been for mote than a century.
Religious policy also played a part in preserving the emperor’s position. Regular pronouncements throughout the century against pagans, Jews or heterodox Christian groups served to re-emphasize imperial piety, a virtue which helped to offset the less martial character of imperial life in the fifth century. Like non-campaigning, however, religious policy could be two- edged in its potential consequences. Chalcedon undoubtedly brought Marcian immediate political benefits in certain vital quarters, but it was also the catalyst for a polarization of opinion within the eastern church which caused increasing difficulties for his successors. Arguably the most impor- tant success of Zeno’s reign was his holding of the resultant tensions in balance, albeit temporarily, through the Henotikon; arguably the most important failure of Anastasius’ reign was his inability to sustain that balance, though as we have seen he was to a considerable extent at the mercy of pressures beyond his control. Interestingly, this was one area where western emperors had far less to worry about, but recognition of that serves only to pose the basic question all the more acutely.
In foreign relations, the east undoubtedly faced some serious tests, pat- ticularly in the Balkan provinces, whose security and economy were placed under severe strain by the Huns during the first half of the century and then by the Goths in the second half. Against these difficulties, however, must be set the experience of Asia Minor, Syria, Palestine and Egypt, which remained securely under government control and suffered only occasional disruption, if any. This situation owed much to the geographical configuration of the region — Asia Minor and Egypt were both well insu- lated from serious external threat — and to the overall stability of relations with the empite’s most powerful neighbour, Persia, despite the existence of the tensions discussed earlier. In addition to circumstances specific to the fifth century such as the preoccupation of both powers with dangers on other fronts, this stability may also in part be attributed to the general con- straint imposed by the sheer difficulty both powers faced in mounting a major invasion without its being anticipated by the other.’
It is in their implications for the area of imperial finances that these con- siderations have their greatest significance: compared with the west, the eastern empire suffered only limited erosion of its tax base. Above all, the revenues of Egypt, whose importance in the eastern economy paralleled that of North Africa in the western, remained at the uninterrupted dispo- sal of Constantinople. Thus even when financial crises occurred, such as those precipitated by Attila’s demands in the late 440s or by the failure of
100 Cf. Lee (1993b) 18-20, 112~20, 139-42.
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Leo’s expedition against the Vandals in 468, imperial finances never lapsed into the downward spiral they did in the west, and the eastern government and its armies were able to continue functioning with a sufficient degree of effectiveness. This underlying economic strength of the eastern empire is further highlighted by Anastasius’ demonstration of what could be achieved through prudent management of the treasury. By the end of his reign, therefore, although continuing ecclesiastical controversy gave cause for concern, the eastern empire was in most other respects in a position to face the future with considerable optimism.
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CHAPTER 3
JUSTIN I AND JUSTINIAN
AVERIL CAMERON
I. JUSTIN I (518-27)
Por understandable reasons the reign of Justin I tends to be eclipsed by that of Justinian, his nephew and successor (527—65). Not only was Justinian already a powerful figure during his uncle’s reign, but Procopius of Caesarea, the leading historian of Justinian, regarded his rule as effectively including that period.' In view of their common background and the con- tinuity of imperial policy in certain areas, Justin’s reign is often associated with that of Justinian in modern accounts.” Although Anastasius had three nephews, Hypatius, Pompeius and Probus, there was no designated succes- sot when he died in 518. As magister militum per Orientem, Hypatius was away from Constantinople, and Justin, then the head of the excubitors (the palace guard), is said to have used cash destined for the support of another candidate to bribe his troops to support his own name; as a result, on 10 July 518 he was proclaimed by the senate, army and people and then crowned by the patriarch.’
The new emperor was already elderly and his background was humble. He originated from Latin-speaking Hlyricum, having been born at Bederiana, near Naissus (Nis), and he owed his success to his career in the guard. According to Procopius he was illiterate,* and in his religious views he was staunchly Chalcedonian. Other contemporaries recorded the arrival of this backward provincial in Constantinople in about 470 and his subse- quent success as something at which to marvel, and the story was depicted in art.° Though the family of Anastasius was to continue to have an influential role,° the new regime was bound to be very different; Justin lost no time in giving the title of comes to his nephew Justinian, who was a can- didatus, and seems also to have formally adopted him.’ Justinian was
' See Cameron, Procopius 9. However, Justin’s reputation suffers in that the evidence comes from the Secret History, where in his intent to blacken Justinian Procopius exaggerates the rusticity of Justin and the ruthlessness of both uncle and nephew.
? E.g, Evans (1996) 96-115; see, however, Stein, Bas-Empire 11.219—73; Vasiliev (1950).
3 Marcell. Chron. s.a. 519; Malal. p. 410; Evagr. HE 1v.1; further, PLRE 11, sn Tustinus 4.
4 SH 6.11; see PLRE u1, 5.0. > Zach. Rhet. HE vuit.1. ® See Cameron, Alan (1978).
7 See PLRE u1, s.v, Tustinianus 7.
63
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64. 3. JUSTIN I AND JUSTINIAN
involved, according to Procopius and others, in the murders in 518 of the pro-Monophysite eunuch Amantius and in 520 of Vitalian, his own closest rival and the consul of the year.® In 519 he was already building a basilica to Sts Peter and Paulin the palace of Hormisdas, and requesting relics from Rome.’ The fall of Vitalian was followed by Justinian’s consulship in A.D. 521, inaugurated by brilliant consular games and from which three sets of diptychs survive;'” he was now magister militum praesentalis, also an office held by Vitalian. Also in the reign of his uncle, and before April 527, he married the Hippodrome performer Theodora, whose early career and exploits Procopius recounts in prurient detail in the Secret History (SH 9.1-30); the marriage was made possible only after the death of Justin’s wife Euphemia, who was strongly opposed to it, and by the passage of a special law allow- ing retired and reformed actresses to petition the emperor for the right to matty even into the highest rank.'! Theodora is praised in the Monophysite tradition for her piety; however, it is not denied there that she was originally a prostitute.”
Both Justin I and Justinian were supporters of Chalcedon. Under popular pressure, within days of Justin’s accession, the patriarch John of Constantinople recognized Chalcedon and condemned Severus of Antioch, while a series of eastern synods sought to overturn the religious measures taken by Anastasius. Justin reopened relations with Rome; Theoderic’s son-in-law Eutharic became western consul for 519 with Justin himself as his eastern colleague, and the ending of the Acacian schism between Constantinople and the papacy was announced in Constantinople in terms favourable to Rome at the end of March, 519.'° Predictably, this led to discontent among eastern Christians, which was met by repression; this was to cause difficulties for Justinian later,'* and the 520s also saw the appearance of other doctrinal issues, with which he had to struggle as emperor.'° In Africa Hilderic, king of the Vandals from 523 to 530, devel- oped a warm relationship with Justinian and lifted the persecution of Catholics in his kingdom, but the alliance with Theoderic in Italy did not prove straightforward; in 524, suspicious of possible plots with Constantinople, the aged king turned on members of the Roman senato- rial class, and when the philosopher Boethius, whose sons had both been
8 SH 6.27-8; Zach. Rhet. HE vii1.1-2; Vict. Tunn. Chron. s.a. 523; PLRE u, sv. Amantius 4; Vitalianus 2. ° Procop. Buildings 1.4.
10 Procop. SH 18.333 23.15 24.29; Cyril of Scythopolis, . Sabae 68. Procop. SH 6.27—28; career of Justinian: PLRE 11.645—8; Bagnall et al, Consuls 576-7.
"CJ v.4.23, 1-4 (A.D. 520-3); Procop. SH 9.51; PLRE 11, s.v. Theodora 1. The name Euphemia was given to the empress on Justin’s accession in preference to the unsuitable Lupicina; Procopius alleges that she had originally been bought by Justin as a slave (SH 6.17; see PLRE u1, s.v. Euphemia 5).
” For John of Ephesus’ Lives of the Eastern Saints, an important source for Theodora, see Harvey, Asceticism and Society in Crisis. 3 Stein, Bas-Empire 11.224-8.
'4 Tbid., 228-325; Egypt escaped the persecution and was able to offer haven to Monophysite exiles.
'5 See below and ch. 27, p. 811 below.
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JUSTINIAN’S EARLY YEARS (527-32) 65
consuls in 522, attempted to intervene he was tried and executed himself; his death was followed in the next year by that of his father-in-law Symmachus, the leader of the senate.'® The king’s own death in 526, leaving his young grandson Athalaric as heir under the guardianship of his mother Amalasuintha, soon provided Justinian with an excuse for intervention in Italy.
In the east, Justin’s government followed the traditional policy of using diplomacy and alliances to maintain Byzantine interests, supporting an Axumite (Ethiopian) expedition against the Jewish regime of Himyar in south Arabia (A.D. 524-5) and adopting a long-term policy of utilizing the Monophysite Ghassanids as federates to balance the pro-Persian Lakhmids.'’ Christianity and Byzantine influence likewise went hand-in- hand in the Caucasus, but here the highly political baptism and marriage to a Christian wife of Tzath, the king of Lazica, in Constantinople led to retal- iatory moves by Kavadh of Persia and to the flight of the Iberian royal family to Constantinople. In Justin’s last year, the generals Belisarius and Sittas raided Persarmenia; as dux Mesopotamiae, Belisarius’ base was the for- tress at Dara, and Procopius the historian now became his aide.'®
II. JUSTINIAN’S EARLY YEARS (527-32)
Before he died on 1 August 527, Justin had made his nephew Justinian co- emperor, and the latter now succeeded.’” He is perhaps best known from his depiction in the famous mosaic in the church of San Vitale, Ravenna. The contemporary chronicle of Malalas describes him as ‘short, with a good chest, a good nose, fair-skinned, curly-haired, round-faced, hand- some, with receding hair, a florid complexion, with his hair and beard gteying’.’ The formula is conventional, but at least the description lacks the sheer malice of that given by Procopius in the Secret History, where Justinian’s appearance is slyly compared with that of the tyrant and perse- cutor Domitian.
The importance of Justinian’s reign has been recognized by contempo- raries and modern historians alike. It is seen as a time of triumph, marking the re-establishment of strong imperial rule, or the transmission of an ideal of Catholic government to the western Middle Ages and the Renaissance. Equally, it has been seen as an autocracy, marked by persecution and ending in failure. The early successes of Justinian’s ‘reconquest’ of the western
'6 See PLRE 11, s.v, Boethius 5 and Symmachus 9, and see ch. 19, p. 525 below.
See Evans (1996) 86-90, 112-14; Fowden (1993); ch. 22¢, p. 678 below; Shahid (1995) 1.1 and 2.
'8 For the diplomatic aspects and the idea of a Byzantine ‘commonwealth’ see Fowden (1993); the subsequent activities of Belisarius are known in detail from Procopius, and are given in detail in PLRE 11, Belisarius 1. 19 Malal. 422.9—21; 424.14-425.9; Chron. Pasch. 616 Bonn.
20 Malal. 425, 1-9, trans. Jeffreys ef a/.; on the ‘portraits’ in Malalas, see Elizabeth and Michael Jeffreys, in Jeffreys et al, Studies 231-44. 2. SH 8.12—21.
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empire were accompanied and followed by profound difficulties; his much- vaunted aim of restoration, realized in the great codification of Roman law which took place in his early years, sat awkwardly with the harsh measures taken against teachers and the effective closure of the academy at Athens; the great church of St Sophia, perhaps his finest achievement, owed its very existence to a serious riot which almost led to the emperor’s own fall. Bitterly opposed, but also eulogized as a Christian monarch, Justinian forced his own compromises on an unwilling church, only to fall into heresy on his deathbed. Edward Gibbon, in his History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, had some difficulty in deciding whether to place Justinian’s reign in the context of Roman success or Greek decline, and indeed it is still an open question whether the emperor’s policies over- stretched the empire’s resources to a dangerous level, as the propaganda of his successor suggests.”
Much of the problem is to be traced to the contradictions to be found between the contemporary sources. Procopius of Caesarea began as the emperor’s ardent supporter, but in the course of the composition of his Fiistory of the Wars in eight books (finished a.p. 5 50/1—5 53/4) turned into his bitter opponent. Procopius’ vituperative pamphlet, the so-called Secret Fiistory, seems to have been composed while the Wars was still in progress (A.D. 550/1), and was followed soon afterwards (A.D. 5 54/5) by a panegyr- ical account of Justinian’s Buildings.?> No reliable biographical data about Procopius exist to provide us with an explanation for this change.” But a similar ambivalence can also be detected in the work On Magistracies by his contemporary John Lydus, a former official in the praetorian prefecture,” and in the work of the North African Latin poet Corippus, who wrote a hexameter poem in praise of the accession of Justinian’s successor Justin II (565-78); like his own contemporary, the historian and poet Agathias, Corippus accords Justinian the respect due to a major emperor while at the same time criticizing him.”° The contemporary Chronicle of John Malalas recotds the reign in detail and from a different and specifically Christian
2 For this see Corippus, Jv landem Iustini minoris 1.250-71; with notes in Cameron, Corippus; Agathias, Hist. v.14; Menander Protector, ed. and trans. Blockley 1985: ft. 8. There is also a hostile portrayal of the reign in the work of the Chalcedonian church historian Evagrius Scholasticus, HE 1v.30f., on which see Allen, Evagrius 171-208. For Gibbon’s view of Justinian see Cameron, Averil (1997).